Volume 103

Issue 2

Article 4

December 2000

The Idea of the Common Law in West Virginia Jurisprudential
History: Morningstar v. Black & Decker Revisited
James Audley McLaughlin
West Virginia University College of Law, james.mclaughlin@mail.wvu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Common Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the United States History
Commons

Recommended Citation
James A. McLaughlin, The Idea of the Common Law in West Virginia Jurisprudential History: Morningstar
v. Black & Decker Revisited, 103 W. Va. L. Rev. (2000).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol103/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

McLaughlin: The Idea of the Common Law in West Virginia Jurisprudential Histo

THE IDEA OF THE COMMON LAW IN WEST
VIRGINIA JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORY:
MORNINGSTAR V. BLACK & DECKER REVISITED
dames Audley McLaughlin*

I.

II.

III.
IV.

THE EXISTENCE OF THE DOCTRINE OVERRULED BY
MORNINGSTAR V.BLACK AND DECKER.........................................
127
A. The Early Cases in West VirginiaRead the
ConstitutionalCommon-Law-Shall-ContinueClause
Reasonably ............................................................
129
B. The Court ContinuesIts Reasonable Reading of the
Common-Law-Shall-ContinueClause Until 1916, But
Seldom Cites the Clause.After 1916, the Court
OccasionallyMakes Weak Use of the Clause. ....................
133
THE IDEA OF COMMON LAW IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY .....
140
A. The ColonialPeriod......................................................
140
B. The Pre-Civil War Period..................................................
146
C. The PeriodFrom the Civil War to the FirstWorld War .....
152
D. The Post-World War IPeriod.............................................
153
USING HISTORY AND LEGAL THEORY TO EXPLAIN WEST
VIRGINIA'S UNNOTICED ABSURDITY .........................................
159
A CONCLUDING LESSON: SYLLABUS POINTS AND THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION ....................................................
163

I remember thinking it odd, very odd, that during a moot court oral
argument, a law student claimed that an English case (Winterbottom v. Wright),
decided in 1840-something, was the law of West Virginia and could not be
overruled by the court-that only the legislature could overrule it. Perplexed, I said,
"But the court could overrule its own decisional doctrine made just two years ago,
right?"
"Yes," came the reply.
"In other words," I said, "a decision made more than a hundred years ago,
Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. I am grateful to the Arthur B. Hodges
Fund for supporting the research for this article. Also, I would like to thank Alex Long and Ann Long for
their help in researching this project.
10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). This is actually the case not followed in
Morningstarv. Black & Decker, infra note 4. I believe it was the case cited by the student in the colloquy
below.
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by a foreign court seventy years after we had declared our independence from that
foreign court's government, was binding on us; whereas a decision made by our
own court, for our state, in our own time, was not binding."
He nodded.
"Doesn't that strike you as absurd?" I continued.
"Well..." came the hesitant reply.
I hurried on: "Where did you get such an absurd notion?"
"From the state constitution," came the now more confident reply.
"Read it," I said.
He read the following: "Such parts of the common law, and of the laws of
this State as are in force on the effective date of this article and are not repugnant
thereto, shall be and continue the law of this State until altered or repealed by the
legislature."2
"But," I said, "who would interpret those words to mean that Winterbottom
v. Wright must now be followed?"
"Our Supreme Court of Appeals," came the reply. Then he cited several
cases.
"Oh," said I, slumping behind the bench.3
The interpretation of Article VIII, Section 13, 4 claimed by the student
advocate to be contained in West Virginia cases would create an absurdity worthy
of Monty Python. Any claim for this absurd reading as part of West Virginia "law"
was laid to rest in Morningstarv. Black & Decker5 in 1979. This claimed reading
of the common-law-shall-continue clause6 was, as far as my research discloses,
never part of the constitutional doctrine of West Virginia, at least in the strong
sense of the Supreme Court of Appeals holding (for instance): "We would find
liability on the facts of this case but for the English case from 1845 that says: no
liability on indistinguishable facts. Since our legislature has not seen fit to overrule
this outdated doctrine, and even though no modem English court and no modem
American state or federal court outside West Virginia follows it, we must adhere to
the mandate of our constitution and follow the 1845 case." Nonetheless, a weaker

2

See infra note 4.

3

My best recollection is that this colloquy took place in 1973. The student was Fred Delp, who, I
also recall, was an excellent student. Of course, the colloquy is reconstructed and not verbatim. Ed note:
Frederick.L. Delp was an Associate Editor of the W.Va. L. Rev. Vol. 77 (1974-75).
4

W.VA. CONST. art.VII, § 13 (1872).

253 S.E.2d 666 (W.Va. 1979). In this case, Justice Thomas B. Miller, speaking for a unanimous
court, refused to follow Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842), as to privity
of contract in products liability cases. The court's operative holding was that a plaintiff in a products liability
case does not need to prove "that the manufacturer was negligent in some particular fashion during the
manufacturing process and to permit [him to prove]... the defective condition of the product as the principal
basis of liability" id. at 677. The court's secondary holding, one that is crucial to this essay, "was ... that
Article VIII, Section 13 of the West Virginia Constitution and W.Va. Code, 2-1-1, were not intended to
operate as a bar to this Court's evolution of common law principles, including its historic power to alter or
amend the common law." Id. at 676.
6
See supra note 4, and quoted in text at note 2.
5
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version of this absurdity may have existed for some time prior to 1979. Even if the
West Virginia Court never allowed a holding to turn on this absurdity, the Court for
years paid lip service to the notion that it was absolutely bound by old cases from
our own, other American courts and English courts (collectively called "the
common law"), but not so absolutely bound by its own more recent cases. What
could have led to this distortion of the doctrine of stare decisis and the idea of "the
common law?"
The answer requires an exploration of the history of American
jurisprudence. The American idea of the law, and especially the private law of
judicial decisions, underwent a metamorphosis from 1863 to 1979 that is reflected
in a fair number of pre-MorningstarWest Virginia cases interpreting Article VIII,
Section 13. However, the jurisprudential metamorphosis was not crystalline and
unproblematic, like a caterpillar becoming a butterfly. Rather, the metamorphosis
was murky, complex, and contested, as is the shifting and changing of any sociallyconstructed, linguistically-dependent reality.7 Because of the rough complexity of
the passage from one jurisprudential explanation to another, the careful, commonsense judges of the West Virginia Court fused several incompatible versions of
what the words "common law" mean. Untangling that conflation is the burden of
this little essay.
I shall begin this untangling by discussing the extent to which it may be
said that West Virginia followed, for a time, a doctrine of absolute adherence to old
common law precedent but of only reasonable adherence to recent common law
precedent. Then I will describe the transformation of the American idea of the
common law from the colonial period to the present. Using the history of that
complex and variegated transformation of the idea of the common law, I shall
attempt an explanation of how the West Virginia Supreme Court came to announce
(if not actually use) the absurd doctrine noted in the opening colloquy. I then
conclude with a caveat about the common law tradition (transformation and all) and
official syllabus points in Supreme Court case reports. That such "caveats" about
the common law tradition might still be necessary after Morningstarois evidenced
by the dissent of Justice Elliot Maynard in a 1999 case9 in which he states that:
"[N]owhere in the Constitution is this Court granted the power to create causes of
action."1
I. THE EXISTENCE OF THE DOCTRINE OVERRULED BY
MORNINGSTR v. BLACK AND DECKER.

In Morningstar v. Black & Decker, Justice Thomas B. Miller takes very
7

For a discussion of the ontology of "social facts," see

JoHN

R. SEARLE,

THE CONSTRUCTION OF

SOCIAL REALITY (1995).

8

See supra note 5.

9

Bower v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 522 S. E. 2d 424 (1999).
Id. at 435. 1shall say more about this dissent below.

10
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seriously the doctrine proposed by Black & Decker's defense lawyers as an
absolute barrier to the Court's reconsidering and modifying the rules of decision in
a products liability tort action. The precise barrier proposed was that as a result of
W.Va. Code, section 2-1-1, and the provision found in Article VIII, Section 13, of
the West Virginia Constitution, the Court is not "empowered to alter the common
law as it existed in 1863."11

Justice Miller cites a number of West Virginia cases pertinent to the
defendant's proposed doctrine, but reaches no definitive conclusion as to its status
as "law" in West Virginia. He no doubt reaches no definitive conclusion because its
status is clearly ambiguous. Before parsing the cases cited by Justice Miller, and a
few more, to try to resolve that ambiguity, a brief taxonomy of the possibilities is in
order.
There are actually four possible manifestations of this doctrine: two
versions of the formulations of the doctrine and two senses of its actual decisional
use. I alluded to both the formulation and the use above when I discussed the strong
and weak versions of the absurdity. I have suggested a strongly absurd formulation
of the doctrine and a more weakly absurd formulation. The strongly absurd
formulation states that one is bound by old cases from a foreign jurisdiction, but not
by newer cases from our own jurisdiction. The weaker version leaves out the
foreign jurisdiction. Our federal union leaves open an intermediate absurdity of
sister-state cases which are not quite a "foreign jurisdiction." It is not as absurd to
be absolutely bound by sister state cases as it is to be bound by English cases.
The strong use of the doctrine requires the application of a rule even when
the court believes the rule to be wrong, obsolete, or even silly. Moreover, the bad
rule is determinative of the case. A decisional doctrine is at its strongest when it
forces a court to use a "bad rule" to reach a "bad result." On the other hand, a
decisional doctrine is at its weakest when it "forces" a court to use a "good rule" to
reach a "right result." "Forces" is now in quotation marks because it take no force
(coercion) to make a court do what it wants to do. A decisional doctrine so used is a
mere rhetorical device, a make-weight, an extra (and unnecessary) reason for the
decision. A decisional doctrine is also weakly used when it is cited but
circumvented. A court might say, "We would have had to reach the wrong result
because of an outdated rule, but we have cleverly dodged the doctrine." When the
doctrine is either a make-weight or circumvented, its decisional force is untested.
Can one determine that a little rhetorical push would in fact become a genuinely
coercive shove, if all one has seen are little rhetorical pushes? The weak use of a
decisional doctrine does not really tell one that the state's law contains that
doctrine. Between uses and formulations, there are four possible combinations
pertinent to our examination of West Virginia cases that make reference to the
decisional doctrine overruled in Morningstar: strong use of the strongly absurd
formulation; weak use of the strongly absurd formulation; strong use of the less
absurd formulation; and weak use of the less absurd formulation.
To be absolutely clear, I am, of course, not saying that it is absurd to be

11

Morningstar,253 S.E.2d at 670.
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absolutely bound by prior case rulings. It may be unwise, or even foolish in certain
cases, but it is not absurd. The English House of Lords, sitting as the United
Kingdom's highest court, had such a rule until recently. 12 But absolute adherence to
old cases, but not more recent cases, is absurd. And absolute adherence to old cases
from another jurisdiction, and not to more recent cases from one's own jurisdiction,
is really absurd.
Prior to 1979, did West Virginia have, as a matter of announced judicial
judgment, some version of the absurdity alluded to above? As will be shown below,
West Virginia never had the strong use of the strongly absurd version, but it may
have had (for a very short, but recent, time) the weak use of the strongly absurd
formulation. Moreover, West Virginia had, for some period after 1910, the weak
use of the weakly absurd formulation.
A.

The Early Cases in West Virginia Read the Constitutional Common-LawShall-Continue Clause Reasonably.

The best evidence for the existence of a rule-one that said that pre-1863
English cases are binding and judicially untouchable-is the legislative gloss put
on the constitutional provision in 1868: "The common law of England,... shall
continue in force within the [state of West Virginia], except in those respects
wherein it was altered by the general assembly of Virginia before [June 20, 1863].
. . or has been, or shall be, altered by the Legislature of this state." 13 Notice that
W.Va. Code, section 2-1-1, specifically mentions England, which the constitutional
provision does not, and it mentions Virginia, from which West Virginia had just
emerged.14 However, it does not mention the courts of Virginia as having had the
power to overrule or modify the English common law. Section 2-1-1 appears to say
that if, for example, an 1806 English case held that the common law doctrine of
"ancient lights" needs only a twenty-year prescription period (instead of "time
immemorial"), and the 1806 decision is ignored, modified, or altogether abrogated
by a 1825 Virginia Supreme Court case, that the 1806 case nonetheless is the law
of West Virginia no matter how abominable the West Virginia court may believe
the 1806 doctrine to be. The above is a "plain reading" of the statutory gloss.
However, the statute has never been read that way.
In 1869, Judge Edwin Maxwell, speaking for the three-member West
Virginia high court, first interpreted the constitutional common-law-shall-continue
See GARY SLAPPER AND DAVID KELLY, ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM, 36-37 (Cavendish 1995). "As
regards its own previous decisions, up until 1966 the House of Lords regarded itself as bound by its previous
decisions. In a PracticeStatement of that year (1966), however, Lord Gardiner indicated that the House of
Lords would in future regard itself as free to depart from its previous decisions where it appeared right to do
so. Given the potentially destabilizing effect on existing legal practice based on previous decisions of the
House of Lords, this is not a discretion that the House of Lords exercises lightly (Food Corp of India v
AnIclizo Shipping Corp (1988)). There have been a number of cases, however, in which the House of Lords
has overruled or amended its own earlier decisions. See, e.g., Conway v. Rimmer (1968); Herrington v.
British Rail Board (1972); Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd (1976); R v. Shivpuri (1986))." Id at 38.
12

13

W.VA. CODE § 2-1-1 (1999).

14

Id.
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clause in Cunningham v. Dorsey. 5 Maxwell characterized the force of the West
Virginia constitutional provision as glossed by the West Virginia Legislature in the
following proposition:
The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to the
principles of the bill of rights and the constitution of the State of
Virginia, was in force in that State when the constitution of the
State took effect, and is, therefore, the law of this State, unless
repealed or modified by the general assembly of Virginia or the
legislature of this State.16
Judge Maxwell quoted the "common-law-shall-continue ordinance" of the
May 1776 Virginia convention (Virginia was anticipating the Declaration of
Independence) to the effect that the "common law of England, and all statutes or
acts of parliament made in aid thereof, prior to [1603] ... shall be in full force until
altered by the legislative power .... , 17 Then he assumed the relevant English cases
were pre-1603 cases. He found one that gave him a time-out-of-memory
prescription period,
which would mean that plaintiff would not get the benefit of an
"ancient lights"18 easement; the result Judge Maxwell apparently wanted. The post1603 case had been influenced by an act of parliament passed after 1603 and
15

3 W.Va. 293 (1869).

16

Id. at 298.

17

Id.

18

The doctrine of "ancient lights" was the most rejected of all English common law doctrines by

American jurisdictions. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 413 (2d ed. 1985):
("By the late 19th century every state except three had rejected this easement."). By 1994, the encyclopedia
Am. Jur. 2d could proclaim: "It has been observed that no American common-law jurisdiction recognizes a
landowner'sright to acquire an easement by prescription." 1 AM. JUR. 2d Adjoining Landowners §91 at 889
(emphasis added) (the emphasized language defines the doctrine of "ancient lights"). The doctrine was an
exception to the common law rule that one had no right to sunlight through adjoining property even if
adjoining property owner's motive for blocking sunlight was pure spite. Koblegard v. Hale, 53 S.E. 793
(W.Va. 1905) (there, for spite, the defendant put up a fence to block sunlight through a church window; so
even preying on praying was allowed in the name of property rights). In order to gain the easement of
"ancient lights" a property owner had to have a window through which sunlight passed continually from
across an adjoining property for the prescription period. The prescription period was twenty years after a
seventeenth-century English Act of Parliament. Prior to that it had been "time out memory." Judge Maxwell
rejected the twenty-year period of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English cases because those cases
were influenced by the Act of Parliament. For Maxwell, time immemorial was the prescription period, a
period few plaintiffs could meet. Judge Berkshire, in Powell v. Sims, 5 W.Va. 1 (1871), left a remnant of the
doctrine for cases of "extreme necessity." This language was picked up by the West Virginia court in 1950 in
Normar v. Ballard, 605 S.E.2d 710 (W.Va. 1950). For a fairly recent, much-cited case, see Prah v. Maretti,
321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982), where using the balancing test of private nuisance law, the Court gives perhaps
some protection to a solar energy home where if the neighbor moved his proposed house just a few feet it
would not destroy the solar house's energy system. Prahdecidedly does not use the doctrine of ancient lights
based on the property concept of prescriptive easement. Nonetheless, it recognizes the interest one has in
receiving sunlight on one's property, and that if it is interrupted for no good reason (spite is out), then a
deprived property owner ought to have relief. This approach is called pragmatism or functionalism.
Competing property interests are accommodated and, perhaps, the public policy of promoting clean,
alternative energy sources is promoted. Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn advocated this kind of common
law growth and change. See infrapassim.
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therefore it was not part of the common law that was binding in Virginia under its
early ordinances and laws. 19 Since the post-1603 English case was not binding in
Virginia, it was not binding in the state newly formed from Virginia's western
counties-West Virginia. It would appear then, that Judge Maxwell believed that
the constitutional reference to the common law's continuance was to the common
law of Virginia, not England.
Judge Maxwell's reasoning goes something like this: West Virginia had
inherited the English common law through Virginia. Virginia, by its 1776
convention, accepted only English common law and those Acts of Parliament "in
aid of the common law" that were passed prior to the colonial period (e.g. The
Statute of Uses of 1536). The post-1603 English Acts of Parliament received no
respect in America in 1776. Thus, any changes in English common law, as
manifested in English cases decided after 1603 and influenced by Acts of
Parliament after 1603, were not part of the "true" common law. (Remember, the
Virginia colonists in 1776 were angry at the English sovereign (King in Parliament)
and not at the revered common law tradition.) The common law of England was not
the hated sovereign's will, but was the ordinance of reason and English customunwritten law made manifest in judicial decisions. The English sovereign (Acts of
Parliament) influenced the post-1603 changes in the common law decisions on
"ancient lights." Therefore, those post-1603 English common law cases were not
part of the common law that was binding in Virginia, and thus binding in West
Virginia.
Hence, Maxwell opined that the doctrine of "ancient lights," as delineated
by pre-1603 cases, is the true common law and it gives no right to the plaintiff in
Dorsey.
Judge Maxwell avoided the hard question in Dorsey: What if the binding
English cases actually give a plaintiff a right to a remedy against impairment of his
"ancient lights," but the court believes in the right to be inappropriate in America's
wide open spaces and in America's policy of individualistic development of
property? In other words, must the court follow English common law cases where
it hates the rights given by those cases?
In 1871, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals got such a case,
Powell v. Sims. 20 Its answer was an emphatic "NO!" Judge Berkshire2' squarely
faced the constitutional issue and stated in an opinion concurred by Edwin Maxwell
that "[tihe common law of England is in force in this state only so far as it is in
harmony with its institutions, and its [the common Law of England's] principles

19

See id
20
5 W.Va. 1 (1871). W.VA. CODE SECION 2-1-2 (1999) expressly abrogates the doctrine of
"ancient lights," but Judge Berkshire does not mention the Act. He probably did not believe the act could be
applied to the pre-1868 facts ofthe case.
21
Ralph Lazier Berkshire of Morgantown, in Monongalia County, West Virginia, was one of three
men elected in 1865 to the first West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and its first "president," i.e. the
presiding judge of the three-judge panel.
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applicable to the state of the country and the condition of society."2 Then in the
Court's second syllabus point, it flatly rejected the English doctrine of "ancient
lights. 23
The rejection of the rule that the Court was absolutely bound by English
cases could not have been more firmly stated: the Court will follow English
precedent when it believes it appropriate to our society, otherwise the court will
simply reject it. Moreover, Powell rejected English precedent after careful
consideration of the constitutional common-law-shall-continue-in-force provision.
Thus, from nearly the beginning of this state's Supreme Court jurisprudence, it
rejected the absurd doctrine that Morningstar v. Black & Decker purported to
overrule. 24
Nor does Judge Berkshire blindly follow "American common law." 25 He
does, however, say that the common law doctrine of "ancient lights" had not fared
well in American courts and that if he followed American judicial precedents, he
would have to reject the doctrine of Ancient Lights. But, in rejecting the
constitutional interpretation that would make English common law cases absolutely
binding, he does not reason that since the constitution uses the phrase "common
law" and not the "common law of England," then the phrase is ambiguous as
between common law of America (for some reason, he does not cite the statutory
gloss that specially refers to English common law), and therefore he is choosing the
common law of America. Rather, he said the following:
The question of easement of lights does not appear ever to have
been before the court of appeals of Virginia, and being therefore
unaided as well as unfettered by any such authoritative
adjudication, we are left free to adopt and apply, to the case now
under review, such principles consistent with the rights of the
parties in the premises, as will in our judgment best comport with
the public good and the existing condition of things in this
22

Powell, 5 W. Va. at 1, syllabus point I (emphasis added).

23

Id. at syllabus point 2; see also supra note 18 as to "ancient lights."

24

Curiously, Justice Miller cited Powell v. Sims, 5 W. Va. 1 (1871), as one of several cases where

the West Virginia court refused to follow an old English case, but had made no mention of the common-lawshall-continue clause.
25
"American common law" is simply the aggregation of sister states' judicial precedent that relies

on no enacted source. After the restatement movement began to spew forth black letter rules of contract,
torts, conflict of laws etc., in the early 1930s, one might say that "restatements" restated American common
law. Of course, starting in the early nineteenth century, American treatise writers compiled an American
common law. The two most famous were Joseph Story (Commentaries-aseries of treatises written between
1831-1845 on Conflicts, Equity and many common law subjects), and James Kent of New York
(Commentaries on American Law in four volumes, published between 1826 and 1830). When Kent's
Commentarieswere published, the great nineteenth century historian George Bancroft declared: "Now we
know what American law is; we know it is a science." LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 329 (2d ed. 1985). For the literature that collectively compiled an American common law (the
nineteenth century's version of the twentieth century's restatements), see the two sections entitled "The
Literature of The Law." Id. at 322-33 & 621-29. Friedman also discusses the restatement movement. See id.
at 676.
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country. The essential inquiry therefore, now26 is what principle
ought to govern us under the facts of this case?

Notice here that Judge Berkshire is stating several things of interest. First,
the English common law cases are no constraint at all. Second, a distinct Virginia
case on Ancient Lights would have mattered and been some constraint ("unaided as
well as unfettered") on the Court's decision, but the words "aided" and "fettered"
taken together suggest that Virginia judicial decisions would have helped inform
their reasoning and been a stare decisis-like constraint, but the Court would not
have felt absolutely bound. Third, other American cases would also be of help and
strongly influential to its judgment, but not be absolutely binding.
The decision in Powell v. Sims has never been overruled or modified.
Indeed, syllabus point 3 of the decision was cited in 1950 in Normarv. Ballard,27 in
which Judge Fred Fox declared that the state Legislature overruled the doctrine of
"ancient lights," even though the 1868 law abrogating "ancient lights" was not
mentioned in Powell v. Sims. In Normar, the Court relied on Powell v. Sims to find
a shrunken version of "ancient lights" extant in West Virginia and, ironically, used
the common-law-shall-continue clause to hold that it must follow the third syllabus
point of Powell v. Sims as to a shrunken version of "ancient lights." I say
"ironically" because rigid adherence to this ancient syllabus point goes against the
spirit of Judge Berkshire's opinion quoted and discussed above. The idea of the
common law had changed in America between 1871 and 1950. I will discuss that
change in Section II. But first we must continue our journey through West Virginia
cases to see when, if ever, West Virginia adopted some permutation of the absurd
reading of the common-law-shall-continue clause.
B.

The Court Continues Its Reasonable Reading of the Common-Law-ShallContinue Clause Until 1916, But Seldom Cites the Clause.After 1916, the
Court OccasionallyMakes Weak Use of the Clause.

If Judge Ralph Lazier Berkshire is any indication, the early West Virginia
Court judged common law cases in the "Grand Style." 28 In a stretch of some
twenty-four years between 1889 and 1912, Henry Brannon dominated the Court.
Brannon had the political values of classical legal thought, 29 but he was not a
formalist. His opinions are full of explanations of the justice, fairness, and
reasonableness (as public policy) of the legal doctrine he had chosen as the basis of
the Court's decision. Yet in comparison to his contemporary, Marmaduke Dent,
Brannon was a formalist. Dent was not just a "Grand Style" judge, he was a
"Flamboyant Style" judge. He quoted poetry (including his own), the Bible, the
26

Powell v. Sims, 5 W. Va. at 4.

27

60 S.E.2d 710 (W.Va. 1950).

28

See KARL N. LLEWELLYN,

29

See MORTON J.HORwiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, THE CRISIS OF

THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, DECIDING APPEALS

(1960).

LEGAL ORTHODOXY 9-31 (1992).
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classics, and myriad other non-traditional sources of the law. 30
In any event, as is well documented in Professor John Phillip Reid's
biographical study of Dent's career (in which Brannon plays a feature role), Dent
and Brannon set a tone for the West Virginia Supreme Court at the beginning of the
twentieth century. 31 To that court, the common law was a process of deciding cases
based on precedent, but the precedent had to be persuasive that the precedential
doctrine was based on justice and sound policy. Brannon and Dent fought over
what was justice (Brannon was on the liberty side, Dent on the equality side of
justice) and what was sound policy. Reid stated:
[Brannon] expounded law in a West Virginia which needed
industry and with this in mind, stressed the need of protecting
corporations, opening the mountainous regions for commercial
exploitation and development. Of course, Dent asked him,
'Opened for whose benefit?' While some legal scholars might
criticize Brannon for ignoring this question, or even for not
appreciating its social 32
implications, they can hardly criticize him
for failing to answer it.
For purposes of the West Virginia idea of the common law, the important
thing is that policy mattered to Brannon and Dent. They believed that the common
law should embody sound public policy.
It would then appear that perhaps until 1916, the West Virginia Court
adhered to the sensible reading of the common-law-shall-continue clause of Powell
v. Sims. 33 For example, in 1914, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit confidently asserted, after citing Judges Berkshire and Brannon, that "we
are of the opinion that even if at common law, as originally adopted by the state of
West Virginia, the organization was unlawful, it does not follow that that part of
the common law is now applicable in that state, owing to the changed conditions to
which we have referred." Yet, in 1916, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals stated, as to a matter of common law procedure, that "[u]ntil altered or
repealed by the legislature such part of the common law ... as were in force when
the constitution was adopted ...

continue to operate and bind the courts of this

state., 35 The Court cites to a 1902 North Dakota case and three encyclopedias as
evidence of the common law rule's furthest extension, which did not reach the case
at bar. The phrase, "the common law" seemed to mean to Judge Poffenbarger, the
30

JOHN PHILLIPS REID, AN AMERICAN JUDGE, MARMADUKE DENT OF WEST VIRGINIA 65-69

(1968).
31

Id.

32

Id.at 73-74.

33

Supra note 20.

34

Mitchell v. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co., 214 Fed. 653, 698 (4th Cir. 1914).

35

Holt v. Otis Elevator, 90 S.E. 333, 335 (W.Va. 1916).
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author, an identifiable body of rules just generally accepted by American judges
and jurists as part of the "common law."
But in 1911, 37 the same court did not cite the constitutional common-lawshall-continue clause in using the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher38 for the first
time: "This principle has few exceptions, and has been applied in a large number of
cases, both in England and this country. '39 From its long discussion and its
reference to Rylands as "a leading English case," it seems fair to assume that the
court adopted the Rylands Rule not because of its pedigree, but because it was
persuaded that its content was just.40 Thus, in 1911, the court appeared to believe
that "the common law" is a process based on precedent that must persuade.
In 1929, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reaffirmed the 1911
attitude in Currencev. Ralphsnyder,41 when it stated:
[t]hat line of cases follows the common law, and is not persuasive
on us, as this court is committed to a more liberal view...
Consequently it is well said that the legal principle upon which
common law champerty is grounded no longer exists. Why then
uphold the body of this law when the spirit has departed.42
The Court then cites a case,43 which cites an 1894 opinion by Henry Brannon
stating that "the reason ceasing the law itself ceases."
Then in 1935, the same court, in a choice of law case, cites the
constitutional common-law-shall-continue clause for the proposition that "the
common law is the basis of the jurisprudence of this state." 45 Therefore, the Court
opines, a common law rule is the basis of West Virginia public policy and trumps
lex loci. But the court indicated it believed the common law to be "a process based
on precedent," and not a "body of rules," when it stated: "We are impressed, as was
the Michigan court in the Bandfield case, that the rule [interspousal tort immunity]
is founded in wisdom; and whatever may have been the original theory of the rule,
in our judgment the fullness of time has justified its existence." Again, the
36

905 SE at 335.

37,

Weaver Mercantile Co. v. Thurmond, 70 S.E.126 (W.Va. 1911).

38

L.L I Ex. 265 (1866); upheld in the House of Lords, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).

39

Weaver MercantileCo., 70 S.E. at 129. But see FRIEDMAN, supranote 18, at 485-86.

40

Weaver Mercantile Co., 70 S.E. at 128.

41

151 S.E. 700 (W.Va. 1929).

42

Id. at 702.

43

Cook v. Citizens' Ins. Co. of Missouri, 143 S.E. 113, 115 (W.Va. 1928).

44

Gill v. State, 20 S.E. 568, 570 (W.Va. 1894).

45

Poling v. Poling, 179 S.E. 604 (W.Va. 1935).

46

Id.
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precedential rule must be persuasive or it will not be followed. Pedigree seems not
to matter.
In 1947, the Court seemed persuaded that an innkeeper should be strictly
liable to guests for injury or property loss or damage. Therefore "the common-law
policy" should continue.4 7 The Court cites an opinion by Marmaduke Dent from
1896.48 Dent had mentioned the "common law of England" as holding the
innkeeper strictly liable but Dent did not cite the constitutional common-law-shallcontinue clause as the reason the rule must be followed. Rather, he is persuaded it
is a good rule based on sound policy. Again, both the 1947 Court and the 1886
Court believe the common law to be a process based on precedent that must
continue to persuade. The common law was to neither court a body of identifiable
rules that could be adopted en masse and incorporated into West Virginia law as a
species of enacted law.
In 1950, in State v. Arbogast,49 the Court seems to invoke and actually use
the common-law-shall-continue clause and the statutory gloss.50 The Court opines
that "[t]he reasons given for the rule are many and varied, none of which seem
logical or sound at this time. 5 ' Although this is a criminal case, the common law
rule was invoked as a defense to the crime of larceny. 2 Since the crime is statutory,
the state's rebuttal to the defense should be statutory too. Moreover, the rule of
lenity favors allowing the common law defense. In any event, the Court did not
need to invoke a pre-1863 English case, because the state conceded "the common
law rule." It cites a West Virginia case that does not invoke the constitution-shallcontinue clause.

3

Then in 1956 and 1962, women's rights became the subject of common
law rulings. In Walker v. Robertson5 4 a challenge was made to an all-male jury in a
civil case. Although the Court invoked the common-law-shall-continue clause to
uphold the all-male jury, real reliance on the clause seems disingenuous. Women,
in 1956, got little constitutional respect. 55 The Court seemed eager to find an excuse
to keep women off juries. Moreover, the Court said that the challenge to the jury
47
48

Shifflette v. Lilly, 43 S.E.2d 289, 291 (W.Va. 1947).
Cunningham v. Bucky, 26 S.E. 442 (W.Va. 1896).

49

57 S.E.2d 715 (1950).

50

See W.VA. CODE

51

57 S.E.2d at 716 (W.Va. 1950).

52

Id. at 716.

§2-1-1 (1999).

Id.
54

91 S.E.2d 468(1956).

55
See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961)(upholding a women's automatic exemption from
jury service unless she requested inclusion on the jury rolls); Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948)(upholding the right of a state to bar women from tending bar); and the most famous (now infamous)
of all, Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872)(upholding the right of a state to bar women from the practice
of law). Not until 1971, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), was a woman's place in the equal protection
clause recognized.
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array was not timely made and there was no showing of prejudice. Finally, the
reference to the "common law" is not to an old English doctrine now in dispute, but
to a current West Virginia practice, a practice that the then male-dominated
government and legal culture seemed to like. So this is a weak case for believing
that the court strongly believed the common law was a body of rules that had been
incorporated into the body of enacted West Virginia law. Nonetheless, it is a clear
case of the fourth permutation of the absurdity: a weak use of the less absurd
formulation.
At first glance, the 1962 case of Seagraves v. Legg,' seems to be the best
candidate to exemplify the strong use of the less absurd formulation of the
following doctrine: if a rule was part of the common law in 1863 (or 1872 when the
constitution was reenacted), then the court may not change it. "The common law"
in the less absurd formulation is a sort of brooding omnipresent body of rules in the
sky-apparently in the sky over England and America and the rest of the English
speaking world.'7 The Court cites the common-law-shall-continue clause,a W.Va.
Code, section 2-1-1, and in effect says only that the Legislature has the power to
change "the common law."5 9 The Seagraves Court spills a lot of ink over the fact
that few states have overruled the common law doctrine that men have a cause of
action for loss of consortium, but women do not.'o Instead of making an argument
to justify the distinction between men and women in making loss of consortium
claims, the Court opines that the Married Woman Acts may have removed the
reason for a man having a claim for loss of consortium.6
In the end, the Court disliked the cause of action for loss of consortium
held by men, and was unwilling to expand this dubious cause of action to include
women. Because equal protection for women was not a fully developed
constitutional claim, the Court failed to take seriously the underlying equality
issues in the case.6 Thus, Seagraves is not a good case for the strong version of the
56

127 S.E.2d 605 (W.Va. 1962).
57
This is obviously a reference to Justice O.W. Holmes famous aphorism in Southern PacificCo. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 207, 218 (1917)(Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes declared that "[t]he common law is not a
brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be
identified." Id. at 222.
58
Seagraves, 127 S.E.2d at 608; W.VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 21.
59

See Seagraves, 127 S.E. 2d at 608.

Id.
61

Id.

62

Id. at 608. The Court stated:
It is the contention of the plaintiff that the denial to her of the cause of action for
negligent loss of consortium of her husband in the case at bar denies her a right granted
her husband and therefore is a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This position is not well taken
when considered in the light of the provisions contained in the Constitution of this State
preserving the common law, coupled with the fact, which is not controverted even in the
cases expressing the minority view, that the wife has no cause of action for such loss of
consortium at common law. Our Legislature has not enacted any law giving her such
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weaker formulation of the absurdity of absolute adherence to old cases. It is not a
case where the court says, "We hate this doctrine but we cannot overrule it because
of the common-law-shall-continue clause." It is however, another case
exemplifying the weak use of the weaker formulation of the absurdity of absolute
adherence to old cases.
In 1965, the Court, in abrogating the doctrine of charitable immunity in
torts, declared that "[i]n as much as the immunity doctrine is not part of the
common law of this state, but rather is case law, this Court is without legal
limitation to reconsider the principles adopted in its former decisions. 6 3 This
distinction between "common law" and "case law" is significant in two ways. First,
it makes clear the absurdity of the weak formulation of the common-law-cannot-bejudicially-changed doctrine (remember the weak formulation is the "common law"
before 1863, the strong formulation is the common law as manifested in pre-1863
English cases). Second, it somehow obscured from Judge Caplan and the rest of the
Court the absurdity of the weak formulation. Apparently, to Judge Caplan, the
"common law" is a "body of rules" that came into the state by constitutional
mandate. "Case law" is apparently, from what Judge Caplan said earlier in his
opinion, a process of deciding cases based on precedent that must persuade the
present court.64 "Case law" then, is exactly what Llewellyn called the "Grand
Style" of common law development. 65 But by calling it "case law," the Court
concealed from itself the fact that "the common law" has always been "case law,"
and "case law" has always relied on stare decisis for both its stability and
flexibility. Without that concealment, the Court would have seen the absurdity of
being absolutely bound by old cases from other jurisdictions (England and
American states), but not absolutely bound by new cases from its own jurisdiction.
Then in 1975, in a progressive decision abrogating the common law
doctrine of municipal tort immunity, Judge Charles Haden, Jr. came the closest of
any opinion writer to use the strong formulation of the absurdity ( i.e. that the court
would be absolutely bound by a pre-Civil War English case) when he wrote:
Consequently, if the common law of England or the laws [passed
by the general assembly] of Virginia prior to June 20, 1863, have
been recognized and applied as having extended a general grant of
immunity to municipalities from tort litigation, the constitutional
and statutory inhibition against judicial abrogation of such
doctrine would appear to present this Court with a formidable
cause of action, which is necessary under the constitution and statutory law of this state
before a wife can have a cause of action for loss of consortium of her husband due to
injuries caused by negligence. Id.
I quote the entire paragraph because it is so remarkable. It must mean, if it is to make any sense at
all, that common law rights are not subject to equal protection evaluation. Does that mean that the common
law is prior to, and privileged over, constitutional law?
63

Adkins v. St. Francis Hosp., 143 S.E.2d 154, 163 (W.Va. 1965)(emphasis added.)

64

Id.at 160-162.

65

See LLEWELLYN, supranote 28, and discussion infra in Section III.
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obstacle to declare otherwise.6
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals noted that a 1964 West Virginia
case67 had a "mistaken understanding of the common law incorporated into West
Virginia jurisprudence."m Therefore, "it, like any other decision, is subject to
reconsideration and if found to be wrong, may be overruled and excised from the
body of decisional law."6 9 "On the other hand," Judge Haden asserted further, "if
that case represents an accurate rendition of the common law in force in the
Commonwealth of Virginia, and consequently operable and binding within the
boundaries of this State prior to June 20, 1863, change from its provisions should
come from the Legislature and not from this Court. 70
Except for the assumption about the "common law in force in the
Commonwealth of Virginia," this statement is what the student advocate told me
was the law of West Virginia in the colloquy quoted at the beginning of this
article.7' It is what I termed "absurd." The slight change by Judge Haden's
reference to the common law in force in Virginia does not reduce the absurdity
because the common law of England was the common law of Virginia until the
Virginia legislature changed it.72 Obviously, Judge Haden, the very voice of West
Virginia legal culture, did not think the strict adherence to old cases from another
sovereignty to be absurd even though he did not believe in such strict adherence to
new cases from his own sovereignty. Why did he not notice the absurdity? Using
the history noted below and some "sense" of his situation, the following
explanation seems plausible: because Judge Haden distinguished Russell v. Men of
Devon,73 he essentially finessed the application of the doctrine to the case at hand
as not being a barrier to the result the court wanted to reach. Judge Haden never
took a hard look at the doctrine itself. If he had taken a "hard look," he might have
questioned his obvious assumption that the "common law" is a body of rules.
Indeed, Judge Haden must have assumed that the common law was a body of
identifiable written rules. He referred to the "common law" in the constitution and
interpreting statute as if it was a "body of rules" which the constitution and statute
incorporated by reference. 74 Further, Judge Haden's doctrine apparently assumed
an almost code-like quality to these "body of rules," such that a constitutional or
66

Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832, 851 (W.Va. 1975).

67

Jones v. City of Mannington, 136 S.E.2d 882 (W. Va. 1964).

68

Long, 214 S.E.2d at 851.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

See supranote 3.

72

215 S.E. at 852-54.

73

2T R.667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788)(cited and distinguished in Long, 214 S.E.2d at 851-52).

74

This body of identifiable "common law" rules is what Judge Caplan had contrasted to "case law"

in Adkins v. St. Francis Hospital. See idat 163.
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ordinary legislator could know of its content. Finally, he had to assume that what
that body of rules is and what it ought to be are entirely separate questions, and
therefore the only important question in determining whether a rule is part of the
body of rules called the "common law" is whether an English common law court
decided it.
These assumptions by Judge Haden are pregnant with implications about
the meanings of both "law" and "the common law." They are the conflation of two
seemingly incompatible ways of looking at "law" and "the common law." Here, a
page (or so) of history is worth an hour or so of analysis. So let us briefly examine
the history of the American idea of the common law because it helps explain West
Virginia's "unnoticed absurdity."
II. THE IDEA OF COMMON LAW IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY

A.

The ColonialPeriod

In the American colonial period (1603-1776) each colony had a judicial
system of some sort, but with no two systems exactly alike. 5 Each had a designated
place, designated officials, and a procedural structure to try private "meum and
tuum" claims, and public criminal cases.7 6 To some extent, they used common law
procedures (e.g. juries) and precedent from English common law courts. 77 Most
lawyers in colonial America, at least in the forty or fifty years just before
independence, would have said their courts were governed by the common law. But
to the general public through most of the colonial period, the "common law"
connoted an ideal.7 The words the "common law" stood for the rights of
Englishmen everywhere?. 9 The rights included the right to trial by jury in criminal
and civil cases, and the right to established rules and standards as opposed to the
arbitrary whim (or despotic edict?) of government.80
' 81
This ideal of established law, "being a government of law not men,
75

See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985).

76

Id.
Id.

78

Id

See id.; see also KERMIT L. HALL el al., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY, CASES AND MATERIALS
(1996); MORTON J. HORWirz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1790-1860 (1992).
See The Declarations and Resolves of the Continental Congress (1774) ("Resolved 5: That the
80
79

respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England and more especially to the great and
inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law.")

reprintedin HALL, supra note 80, at 64-65.
81
The first use of the phrase "Government of laws, and not of men" was by John Adams (17351826), our second president, while back in Boston after attending the First Continental Congress, in a series
of letters to the Boston Gazette signed "Novanglus." Adams attributed it to James Harrington (1611-1677),
an English radical Whig who wrote THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA (1556), with which Adams was
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included, when the phrase "common law" was used, law that was deep and old and
true.82 It referred to a tradition of unwritten customary law honed and articulated
and refined in countless lawsuits, where the "artificial reason" of trained and
experienced judges worked to ever greater perfection the standards and rules for
settling disputes and punishing miscreants.as But the "common law" also connoted
a strong negative. Many who used the phrase "common law" negatively criticized it
as being unnatural and involving unnecessary complexity and prolixity. To them, it
meant a body of esoteric knowledge available only to lawyers. a4 The common law
was sophisticated law to rude, sparsely-populated, unlettered communities;
sophistication meant delay, technicality, and injustice.a5
The "common law," then was truly a bog of connotations. What, if
anything, did it denote? What real world "thing" did it reference? It denoted a body
of principles, standards, and rules collected in printed form by Sir Matthew Hale in
his history first published in 17 13 ,86 by Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634),87 by Sir
familiar. See JUSTIN KAPLAN, BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 337 (16th ed. 1992).

See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 10 (1969).
Indeed, what is truly extraordinary about the Revolution is that few Americans ever felt
the need to repudiate their English heritage for the sake of nature or of what ought to be.
In their minds natural law and English history were allied. Whatever the universality
with which they clothed their rights, those rights remained the common-law rights
embedded in the English past, justified not simply by their having existed from time
immemorial but by their being as well "the acknowledged rights of human nature." The
great appeal for Americans of Blackstone's Commentaries stemmed not so much from
its particular exposition of English law, which, as Jefferson said, was all "honeyed
Mansfieldism," sliding into Toryism, but from its great effort to extract general
principles from the English common law and make of it, as James Iredell said, "a
science." The general principles of politics that the colonists sought to discover and
apply were not merely abstractions that had to be created anew out of nature and reason.
They were in fact already embodied in the historic English constitution - a constitution
which was esteemed by the enlightened of the world precisely because of its
"agreeableness to the laws of nature." The colonists stood to the very end of their
debate with England and even after on these natural and scientific principles of the
English constitution. And ultimately such a stand was what made their Revolution seem
so unusual, for they revolted not against the English constitution but on behalf of it.
Id at 10 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
83
"[Sir Edward] Coke... replied that the reason on which law was founded was a species of
"artificial reason" that only a person trained and experienced in law could exercise." RICHARD A. POSNER,
82

THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 10 (1990).

84

See FRIEDMAN, supranote 75, at 108, and passim.

8

Id.

86
1971).
87

See SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (Charles M. Gray ed.

For a biographical sketch of Coke, see THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 242-45 (5th ed. 1956); CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE, THE LIFE
AND TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 508-512 (1957). In Klopler v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967),Chief
Justice Earl Warren stated "Coke's institutes were read in the colonies by virtually every student of the law.
Indeed, Thomas Jefferson wrote that at the time he studied law (1762-67), Coke Lyttleton was the universal
elementary book of law students and to John Rutledge of South Carolina, the Institute seemed "to be almost
the foundation of our law." Id. at 225.
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Anthony Fitzherbert (1470-1538), 88 by Sir Thomas Littleton (1422-1481),89 by
Henry of Bratton (called Bracton)(1210-1268), 90 and by Ranulf de Glanville (11301190). 9' Then, in the later eighteenth century, came William Blackstone's
Commentaries, which eclipsed all the others. 2 After 1765 or so, a reference to "the
common law" meant the law crystallized in Blackstone.93 The English legal
historian F.W. Maitland wrote in 1902:
Accurate enough in its history and doctrine to be an invaluable
guide to professional students and a useful aid to practitioners,
[Blackstone's] book set before the unprofessional public an
artistic picture of the laws of England such as had never been
drawn of any similar system. No nation but the English had so
eminently readable a law-book, and it must be doubtful whether
any other lawyer ever did more important work than was done by
the first professor of English law. Over and over again the
Commentaries were edited, sometimes by distinguished men, and
it is hardly too much to say that for nearly a century the English
lawyer's main ideas of the organization and articulation of the
body of English law were controlled by Blackstone. This was far
from all. The Tory lawyer little thought that he was giving law to
colonies that were on the eve of a great and successful rebellion.
Yet so it was. Out in America, where books were few and lawyers
had a mighty task to perform, Blackstone's facile presentment of
the law of the mother country was of inestimable value. It has
been said that among American lawyers the Commentaries "stood
for the law of England," and this at a time when the American
daughter of English law was rapidly growing in stature, and was
preparingherselffor her destined march from the Atlantic to the
Pacific Ocean. Excising only what seemed to savor of oligarchy,
those who had defied King George retained with marvelous
tenacity the law of their forefathers.94
So to the colonial mind, the words "common law," denoted a more-or-less
fixed set of words in the form of rules and standards. Professor Morton J. Horwitz,
in The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860, begins his book with this
88

See PLUCKNETT, supranote 87, at 274-75.

89

Id. at 241, 277-78.

90

Id. at 25 8-65 and passim.

91

Id. at 256-57, 295-98,

92

FRIEDMAN, supra note 75, at 21.

93

Id. at 112.

HELEN M. CAM, SELECTED HISTORICAL ESSAYS OF F.W. MAITLAND 116-17 (1957), in an essay
entitled "History of English Law" (emphasis added).
94
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observation:

In eighteen-century America, common law rules were not
regarded as instruments of social change; whatever legal change
took place generally was brought about through legislation.
During this period, the common law was conceived of as a body of
essentiallyfixed doctrine to be applied in order to achieve a fair
result between private litigants in individual cases.95
Fixed doctrine though it be, it was widely understood that there was no
canonical form, no codification equivalent, of the common law. It was not statutory
(or positive) law. It was unwritten law. This "unwritten law" was discovered and
articulated by judges deciding actual cases. These judges discovered norms
immanent in either immemorial custom or usage, or in natural law and justice, and
in the law that "every man has implanted in him." Unwritten law existed at the
beginning of time. Thus, a classic case of first impression or an unprecedented
judicial decision could be retroactively applied to the facts before the court. The
new decision was not really retroactive application of new law, because the
pronounced law had become immanent in our known customs. New law became a
true rule ready for reason's discovery in the hearts of men who "just know" right
from wrong.
Custom, reason, and human nature are really three different, though
complimentary, ontological forms of law, but more importantly, each suggests a
different epistemology. "Custom" has an empirical aspect to it. "Reason" has a
Platonic aspect that it alone can discover the true rule, the natural law. It is not
unlike discovering the natural truths of geometry. "Implanted law" is intuitive
because we "just know" it. It is part of human nature and therefore, Aristotelian. In
one historic epoch or another, they each have been dominating as the explanation
for the genius and genesis of the common law. In the colonial period in America, a
common belief was that common law was a product of immemorial custom
tempered by judicial reasoning.
Each of the three explanations for the genesis of the common law yields a
somewhat different justification for any particular doctrine. Moreover, each leads to
different (and sometimes decisively different) explanations for change, for filing
gaps in the law, for transferring the common law to a new locale, and for applying
"new" common law rules, retroactively. Of special importance to the colonies was
transferring the common law to the thinly populated, rural, and agricultural
vastness that became the American Colonies. Thus, a common law doctrine such as
"ancient lights" could be said not to be a custom in America because of the paucity
of population and the concomitant diminished fear that one's use of one's own
property might have an impact on others. The doctrine seems not based in any
natural law, such as "use one's property so as not to harm others," because there is
really no harm from blocking light on the one side in open America. Because

95

See HORWITZ, supra note 29, at 1.
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America was geographically and socially much different from Britain, it naturally
developed different customs which early judges acknowledged required deviation
from English common law norms.96 So if common law rules are based on natural
law, the colonial mind's reason might well have found that the "natural law"-as
discovered by the British mind's reason-a mistake. When a common law rule was
based on mistaken reasoning, it could be overruled. It was in this ability to change
and to correct that the common law "works itself pure." 97
Although common law doctrine may always be "working itself pure," the
phrase "the common law," or even the phrase "the common law of England,"
denoted more than a specific set of doctrines. It also denoted a historically
developed legal system. Within that legal system, modes of proceeding were
contrasted to "common law." "Equity" was the focal contrast. But the legal system
referred to as the "common law" included equity, as well as lesser contrasts, such
as ecclesiastical law, maritime law, or the law of merchants. 98 All of these were
influenced by the judicial discovery of natural justice and natural law. However, the
latter three were also greatly influenced by civil law (based on the written Roman
codes). 99 Moreover, ecclesiastical law sometimes used Canon Law.100 But as Sir
Matthew Hale pointed out, both the civil law and canon law were unwritten laws
procured by English judges-not from the enacting legislature's sovereignty (the
Roman Catholic Church, or the Holy Roman Empire).0 1 Thus, equity law,
ecclesiastical court law, maritime law, and the law of merchants, were part of the
unwritten law of England and thus part of that system of law collectively called
"the common law of England." An American colonist may have considered the
common law to be all the law of England except acts of Parliament. He may also
have had in mind other systems of enacted laws that conflict with the "common
1
law," such as the Canon Law enacted by the Roman Church and Civil Law. 02
In sum, the idea of the common law that would inform the intent of the
Virginia constitutional use of the term, and later the same West Virginia use, is
both complex and somewhat contradictory. "Common law" connoted good and bad
On the "reception" of the common law in America, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 75; HALL, supra
note 79, at 24-25.
97
The phrase "the common law works itself pure" is Lord Mansfield's. See FRIEDMAN, supra note
9

75; HALL, supra note 80, passim, for discussion of this most famous of eighteenth century English jurists.
See also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 400 (1985). William Murray, 1st Earl of Mansfield (1705-93),
was Lord Chief Justice from 1756 to 1788. Mansfield was a large influence on William Blackstone and
Joseph Story.
98
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 75, at 48-58; PLUCKNETT, supranote 87, at 675-707.
See PLUCKNETT, supranote 87, at 294-300.

100

See id. at 301-306.

101

See POSNER, supra note 83, at 16-29.

102

"Civil Law's" early genesis was various codes of the Roman Empire and carried on in various

forms in continental European states including those in the Holy Roman Empire. "Civil Law's" modem
genesis is the Code Napoleon. For an excellent brief discussion of Civil Law, Canon Law, and the Common
Law, see FLOYD L. WEINREB, NATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE 43-53 (1987).
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things, and denoted both a system of English law and a subpart of that same
system. What, then, did the Virginia and later West Virginia constitutional enacting
conventions intend? They wanted to form a system of law that consisted of the law
in effect immediately prior to the Colonies becoming an independent sovereign,
except for that part based on the enacted law of the old sovereign (England or
Virginia). The State will supply new enacted law. As the old enacted law overruled
and deviated from common law principles, it became accepted by courts of the
former sovereign as alterations of the common law. This latter point is somewhat
controversial because of the way the Virginia provision of 1776 was worded as
quoted in the 1869 West Virginia case.10 3 But the West Virginia Constitution
contained no anti-Virginia-enacted-law provision, unlike the Virginia constitution,
which contained an anti-English-enacted-law provision.'04
Above all else, the phrase "the common law" stood for apolitical (or "prepolitical") 0 5 law-law based on reason, traditional community morality, and
custom, not political calculation, political victories, or political compromises. So
the phrase "the common law" meant that the apolitical legal system used by the
courts for civil and, on occasion, criminal cases, should continue. The new political
sovereign will supply a new set of political laws, which political laws may trump or
supplant the apolitical rules of the common law. Of course, the apolitical system
contained both a tradition of change and a theory of reception by colonial regimes.
Thus, nothing about the phrase "the common law" invited law frozen in time or
space. Even the phrase "the common law of England," used by the West Virginia
Legislature to "clarify" the constitutional provision, had a tradition of change for
changing times and changing places.
What could Black & Decker's lawyers have been thinking when they made
the absurd argument that we began this essay with? 106 Neither West Virginia
judicial precedent,107 nor the American idea of the common law supports it. They
were thinking twentieth-century ideas of the common law and imposing them on a
nineteenth-century use of the phrase "the common law." Let us look briefly at the
transformation of the idea of the common law in post-Colonial America. Scholars
who have studied the patterns of judicial decision making in American history
divide these patterns into three periods: from the Revolution to the Civil War, from
the Civil War to World War I, and from World War I to the present. I shall use
these periods, rough as they are, to describe the metamorphosis of the idea of the
103

See Cunningham, 3 W.Va. 293 (1869); supra note 15.

104

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

105

For frequent use of the term "pre-political," see HoRwrrz, supra note 29. Rights exist naturally,

prior to political choice, and governments exist to add coercion to the moral suasion of the right.
106

Supra notes 4-5.

107

There was some weak use of the absurd doctrine as explained above. But there had never been the

strong use of either the strong or weak formulation of common-law-cannot-be-changed doctrine. But see
Judge Haden's opinion in Longv. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1975) and Judge Caplan's opinion
in Atkins v. St. FrancisHospital, 143 S.E.2d 154 (W. Va. 1965). These cases give colorable support to the

lawyers' claim.
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common law.
B.

The Pre-Civil War Period

In the period of the first Industrial Revolution in America roughly up to the
Civil War, the common law was in the process of fresh discovery. The union of
states was populating and utilizing a vast new continent (remember America first
doubled (1803), then tripled (1848), in land mass), adjusting to new steam-driven
industry, beginning urbanization, and gradually increasing immigration from
northwestern European countries. 108 The late Professor Grant Gilmore called this
the Age of Discovery.'0 9 Karl Llewellyn in his masterpiece of post-modem
empiricism (he read and discussed scores of cases picked mostly at random), called
it the age of the Grand Style of the Common Law.110 Llewellyn believed that to the
better judges of this era precedent was "welcome" and "very persuasive," but that it
must be tested against three types of reason: (1) the reputation of the opinionwriting judge (think of Lord Mansfield, Joseph Story, James Kent, Lemuel Shaw,
John Gibson), (2) "sensible" and ordering "principle[s]," and (3) sound policy (i.e.
the prospective consequences of the rule's benefit to the community)."' His use of
the words "principle" and "policy" require further explanation.
"Principle" is a verbal formulation of the reason or a reason it is just to
settle a claim either for or against liability. For example, the idea that "one ought
not to be liable for consequences that are not foreseeable [or reasonably
foreseeable]" is a principle at work in many common law precedential rules." 2
Notice that a principle evokes a sense of justice, and is backward looking because it
is concerned with past events. Policy, on the other hand, is a compound of guessing
at what behaviors will eventuate as a consequence of people relying on the
precedential rule and a judgment about whether that behavior will be good for the
comnmunity. If, for example, a person is not responsible for any damages from a
breach of a promise to perform (except those that are the immediately foreseeable
consequences of the breach), she will be more likely to make promises to perform.
The principle facilitates contract formation. Facilitating contracts is the facilitation
of commercial exchange, which increases total wealth, which in turn is good for the
community. Thus, a rule based on a principle of moral foreseeability of contract
damages furthers the policy of encouraging economic activity.
Kermit Hall says that "[t]he period from 1787 to 1861 has been called the
'golden age' of American law. Scholarship on the era describes it as 'the creative

Two recent books on this era are CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION, JACKSONIAN
AMERICA (1815-1846) (1991) and MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY,
JACKSONIAN POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR (1998).
109
See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
108

110

See LLEWELLYN, supra note 28.

lil

Id. at 36-37.

112

E.g. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 314 (1854).
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period,' 'the transformation' of law and 'the Americanization' of the law." 113
'
The
Roscoe Pound called this period the "formative era of American law."114
consensus among scholars who have studied this era is that the common law was
viewed more as a process than a set of rules. The common law was a process of
deciding private law suits. A process whose hallmark is consistency with past
decisions, but a process that is not a slave to consistency; the common law process
takes a nuanced common sense approach to consistency. The past is reexamined.
The future is anticipated. Judges are self-consciously crafting law-not making it
wholesale like legislatures-but discovering "true" principles of right relationships
between members of a community. These "true" principles imply norms of
behavior, which norms ought to be for the good of the community. The good of the
community, in this era, usually meant economic expansion." 5 It apparently
eschewed formalistic approaches to legal craftsmanship. 1 6
When West Virginia became part of the Union in 1863, this was the
dominant view of the law in legal culture. Judge Berkshire's opinion in Powell v.
Sims 117 perfectly exemplifies this approach.' 18 But it must not be forgotten that in
this pre-Civil War era, the common law was viewed as a species of natural law.
The common law was not the positive law of some sovereign, whether the
sovereign be state government or federal government. This natural law feature of
"the common law" carried over into the post-Civil War era to be discussed next.
But the concrete implications of this "natural law not positive law" feature of
nineteenth century "common law" requires further exploration.
In a famous 1834 case, Wheaton v. Peters,"9 Justice M'Lean wrote an
opinion, concurred by Joseph Story and John Marshall, eight years before Swift v.
Tyson, 120 that said:
It is clear, there can be no common law of the United States. The
federal government is composed of twenty-four sovereign and
independent states; each of which may have its local usages,
customs and common law.... The common law could be made a
part of our federal system, only by legislative adoption.' 2 '

113

HALL, supranote 79, at 114.

114

Id.

115

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 18 and passim.

"

116

See HORWITz, supra note 29,passim.

117

5 W. Va. I (1871).

118

See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.

119

33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).

120

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Swift is, of course, the case overruled in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304

U.S. 64 (1938).
Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 658.
121
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The Wheaton Court continued:
When, therefore, a common law right is asserted, we must
look to the state in which the controversy originated ....

[W]e

may inquire whether the common law, as to copyrights, if any
existed, was adopted in Pennsylvania. It is insisted, that our
ancestors, when they migrated to this country, brought with them
the English common law, as part of their heritage. That this was
the case, to a limited extent, is admitted. Not one will contend,
that the common law, as it existed in England, has ever been in
force in all its provisions, in any state in this union. It was
adopted, so far only as its principles were suited to the condition
of the colonies: and from this circumstance we see, what is
common law in one state, is not so considered in another. The
judicial decisions, the usages and customs of the respective states,
must determine, how
far the common law has been introduced and
122
sanctioned in each.
In argument, it was insisted, that no presumption could be
drawn against the existence of the common law, as to copyrights,
in Pennsylvania, from the fact of its never having been asserted,
until the commencement of this suit. It may be true, in general,
that the failure to assert any particular right, may afford no
evidence of the non existence of such right. But the present case
may wellform an exception to this rule.
If common law, in all its provisions, has not been
introduced into Pennsylvania, to what extent has it been adopted?
Must not this court have some evidence on this subject. If no right,
such as is set up by the complainants, has heretofore been
asserted, no custom or usage established, no judicial decision been
given, can the conclusion be justified, that, by the common law of
Pennsylvania, an author has a perpetual property in the copyright
of his works. These considerations might well lead the court to
doubt the existence of this law in Pennsylvania; but there are
others of a more conclusive character.
Can it be contended, that this common law right, so
involved in doubt as to divide the most learned jurists of England,
at a period in her history, as much distinguished by learning and

122

Id. at 658-59
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talents as any other; was brought into the wilds of Pennsylvania
by its first adventurers. Was it suited to their condition? But there
is another view still more conclusive.
In the eighth section of the first article of the constitution
of the United States it is declared, that congress shall have power
"to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries." And in pursuance of the
power thus delegated, Congress passed the act of the 30th of May
1790.123

The Court also stated that "[the common law] is said to be founded on
principles ofjustice, and that all its rules must conform to sound reason."124
By seeming contrast, Justice Story wrote the following in Swift v. Tyson:
But, admitting the doctrine to be fully settled in New York, it
remains to be considered, whether it is obligatory upon this court,
if it differs from the principles established in the general
commercial law. It is observable that the courts of New York do
not found their decisions upon this point upon any local statute, or
positive, fixed, or ancient local usage; but they deduce the
doctrine from the general principles of commercial law. It is,
however, contended, that the 34th section of the Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, furnishes a rule obligatory upon this court to follow
the decisions of the State tribunals, in all cases to which they
apply. That section provides "that the laws of the several states...
shall be regarded as rules of decisions in trials at common law in
the Courts of the United States, in cases where they apply. In
order to maintain the argument, it is essential, therefore, to hold,
that the word "laws," in this section, includes within the scope of
its meaning the decisions of the local tribunals. In the ordinaryuse
of language it will hardly be contended that the decisions of
courts constitute laws. They are at most only evidence of what the
laws are, and are not of themselves laws. They are often reexamined, reversed and qualified by the courts themselves,
whenever they arefound to be either defective, or ill-founded, or
otherwise incorrect. The laws of a state are more usually
understood to mean the rules and enactment's promulgated by the
123

Id. at 659-660 (emphasis added).

124

Id. at 658.
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legislative authority thereof, or long established local customs
having the force of laws. In all the various cases, which have
hitherto come before us for decision, this Court have uniformly
supposed that the true interpretation of the 34th section limited its
application to state laws strictly local, that is to say, to the positive
statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by the
local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a
permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate, and
other matters immovable and intraterritorial in their nature and
character. It never has been supposed by us, that the section did
apply, or was designed to apply, to questions of a more general
nature, not at all dependent upon local statutes or local usages of a
fixed, and permanent operation, as, for example, to the
construction of ordinary contracts or other written instruments,
and especially to questions of general commercial law, where the
State tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions as
ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon general reasoning and legal
analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract or
instrument, or what is the just rule furnished by the principles of
commercial law to govern the case. And we have not now the
slightest difficulty in holding, that this section, upon its true
intendment and construction, is strictly limited to local statutes
and local usages of the character before stated, and does not
extend to contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature,
the true interpretation and effect whereof are to be sought, not in
the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the generalprinciples
and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence. Undoubtedly, the
decisions of the local tribunals upon such subjects are entitled to,
and will receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of this
court; but they cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive
authority, by which our own judgments are to be bound up and
governed. The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly
declared in the language of Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield in
Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. R. 883, 887, to be in a great measure, not the
law of a single country only, but of the commercial world. Non
erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed125et
apud omnes gentes, et omni tempore una eadmque lex obtinebit.
The untranslated Latin quotation from Cicero is part of a famous oration
on natural law that I here give you a little more of, in translation (with the part
Justice Story quoted in italics):
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal

125

Swift, 41 U.S. at 18-19 (emphasis added).
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application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its
commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. It is a
sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal
any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot
be freed from its obligation by senate or people, and we need not
look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And
there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different
law now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law
will be validfor all nations and all times, and there will be one
master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of
this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is
disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature,
and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties,
126
even, if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment.
Can Wheaton and Swift be reconciled? Notice that Story does not say that
"general doctrines and principles of commercial jurisprudence" are the common
law of the United States. They are not the law of any place because they are not the
command or "articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign., 127 Rather, the
doctrines are the ordinance of reason, a proposition that is consistent with
1 28
M'Lean's claim "that all [common law's] rules must conform to sound reason.
In Wheaton, the issue was whether a non-statutory right to copyright existed.1 29 It
did not exist "at common law," but it did exist problematically in England after
1760.130 Therefore the question was, "had it been received in the United States?"
The reception of recent English cases is a matter for each state's courts to decide.
Since there was no common law right to copyright by ancient prescription, then
only the deliberate choice to follow an English case could create a right. That
deliberate choice is a quasi-sovereign act, not just the ordinance of reason. In Swift
it was not a question of the existence of a right, but an acknowledged right's exact
contours-contours dictated by reason alone. The learned Story did not believe the
federal courts ought to be stuck with the bad "reasoning" of mediocre judges.
In any event, Story's natural law view of "the common law" carried the
day, indeed the next 95 years.131 Justice M'Lean viewed the common law as being
essentially natural law. Yet, he felt that some parts of the law were unreasonable
126

Quoted in LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 40-41 (1987) ( His footnote

attributes the translation to CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA (Clinton Walker Keyes trans., Cambridge, Mass. 1928)).
127
Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
128

Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 658.

129

Id. at 659.

130

Id.

131

For an excellent discussion of Story's natural law views of the common law and of the basis of the

decision in Swift, see GERALD T. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT

403-423 (1970).
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(copyright law being such a part), such that its adoption in America required a
deliberate act by common law state courts-not federal courts.
C.

The PeriodFrom the Civil War to the first World War

Sometime after the Civil War the "Grand Style" changed to the "Formal
Style." The "common law" changed from being a decisional process to a finite
body of basic principles. The principles were "discovered" by reason, exploring the
best of old cases, mostly English, in a scientific way.13 2 Law was a science
according to the chief architect of this new formalism, Christopher Columbus
Langdell, Dean of the Harvard Law School from 1875 to 1895.'33 "Policy" was not
a legitimate subject of judicial decision-making. All a court could legitimately do
was find the law in the form of a rule and apply it according to its literal terms.
"Policy" is political. The "law," and judges, are apolitical.
Progressive historians such as Llewellyn, Gilmore, and Horwitz tend to
this late nineteenth-century tendency in the judicial craft. Llewellyn
read
over
135
34
era of the Formal Style.' Gilmore called it the Age of Faith.
the
it
called
Horwitz called it the era of "classical legal thought." '3 All three hated it for three
general reasons. First, it was an era defined by an apolitical set of conservative
political value choices that favored individual private power over public or
collective power. 37 Second, the common law was "true law." Legislation was an
intrusion on the purity of the true law; therefore, legislation must be read narrowly
and tested against time-honored common law principles. 38 Third, the common
law's true rules and their formalistic and conceptualistic application made it
difficult to make progressive reforms within the common law.
Notice that there are two big differences between the Grand Style and the
Formal Style eras. First, the Grand Style is very open to change; the Formal Style is
quite closed. Second, the Grand Style gives some recognition that judges make
some policy choices in judging, while Formal Style jurists insist on the apolitical
nature of law and judging. But notice further that both nineteenth-century styles
assumed that judges discovered the law, declared the law, and classified the law,
but they did not make the law. It was not the product of their will, either political or
moral. Judicial decisions were a product of judgment, not will. "Judgment" in the
earlier era included sound social policy and natural justice. In the later era,
132

See HORWITZ, supra note 29, at 10-20. See also GILMORE supranote 109, at 41-67.

133

Id.

134

LLEWELLYN, supra note 28, at 38.

135

GILMORE, supranote 109, at 41-67.

136

HORWTZ, supra note 29, at 9-3 1.

137

See id. passim (private property was nearly absolute and the free market was the measure of true

value).
138

This greatly handicapped the progressive political agenda which operated mostly through

legislative reform.
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"judgment" meant mostly the formal extension of preexisting rules long since
extracted from "true" principles of justice.
D.

The Post-World War IPeriod

In the middle of the formal period arose a revolutionary figure disguised as
a conservative Republican--Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. This thrice-wounded Civil
War veteran, and scion of a physician-scientist-poet-essayist, saw law as essentially
political. 139 He did not, however, see it as merely political or as partisan politics. To.
Holmes, law was based on the enactments of legislatures and the accumulated
decisions of judges acting for the convenience of the community. His attack on the
then-prevailing Formal Style was both an attack on prevailing beliefs about what
the law is and as to what it ought to be. His quarrel with nineteenth-century
formalism was that the Langdell- inspired description of the common law was
14 His famous phrase, "the life of law has not been logic; it has been
wrong."
experience," 141 was meant to convey both a sense of "doing" law and of "being"
law. Logic, especially deductive logic, was not how the common law was in fact
developed and extended, and was not how it ought to be developed and extended.
His assertion that experience is the life of the law is an assertion about legal method
(trial and error is better than logic) and about legal content. The content of the law
is, and ought to be, rules directing behavior in a way useful to (good for) the
community. The common law is legislation. Holmes takes the Grand Style's
concern for policy
and makes it the major concern of common law development
142
and extension.
In its baldest form, the Holmes claim is that the common law is positive
law. It is not a species of natural law, it is not unwritten. The common law is law
that is made, not discovered, by judges. The existence of a common law doctrine is

139

See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS, THE LIFE OF O.W. HOLMES (1946).

140

Holmes was not doubt influenced by John Austin's, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined

(1832). See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, LAW AND THE INNER SELF, 87, 117,
and passim (1993).
141

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1963) (was originally

published in 1881) at 5. It is worth quoting the entire paragraph following the textual quotation:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or

unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should

be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many
centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries
of a book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been,
and what it tends to become. We must alternately consult history and existing theories
of legislation. But the most difficult labor will be to understand the combination of the
two into new products at every stage. The substance of the law at any given time pretty
nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be convenient; but
its form and machinery, and the degree to which it is able to work out desired results,
depend very much upon its past.
142

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE PATH OF THE LAW (1895).
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entirely dependent on judicial pronouncement. If the common law is judicial
legislation, then it ought not to be privileged over elected legislatures' enactments.
Indeed, in a democracy, elected legislatures' enactments are much more likely to
represent the will of the people than are judicial enactments.
That legislation is privileged over common law rights and duties is
succinctly set out in Holmes's dissent in Lochner v. New York. 143 Justice Rufus
Peckham's opinion for the five-man majority in Lochner marked the full fruition of
the Age of Faith, of the Era of the Formal Style. 144 Indeed, Lochner's majority
privileged the common law principle of freedom of contract over a legislative
judgment that the good of the community demanded some limits on the common
law right to contract.)" The New York legislature's judgment that the absolute
freedom to contract for one's labor was not good for employees was given no
deference by Justice Peckham, who blindly followed the common law's assumption
of a free market for labor untilted by the industrial employer's power. 146 Yet, this
was living in a fool's Eden-a garden that no longer existed, if it ever did.
Progressives hated Lochner v. New York. Indeed, Lochner served as a
catalyst for a change in thinking about the nature of law. To the progressive, all law
was legislated. In a democracy, therefore, the judge-made law of the common law
ought to defer to the law made by the people's representatives elected for that
purpose. Legal scholarship, mostly by law professors, urged a new view of the
common law-a view more consistent with Holmes's view adumbrated in his 1895
lecture, The Path of The Law, 147 and bluntly applied in his famous dissent in
Lochner.148 For thirty years, scholars toiled for a new vision of the common law.
Two somewhat distinct visions of common law positivism developed, both tracing
themselves to Holmes. 149 Each had a different impact on how judges developed,
extended, and changed the common law. Let's call these ways of viewing the
common law "analytical positivism" and "realistic positivism."
In analytical positivism, the common law became rules laid down by
judges who were the sovereign's agents. As with classical legal thought
(formalism) the common law was a body of rules. Unlike classical legal thought,
the rules are "laid down" by judges, not "discovered." The judge acts more like the
classical legislator than the classical judge. To be sure, the legislating judge must
have classical "civic virtue"--that is, he must legislate for the good of the
143

198 U.S. 45, at74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

144

See id. at 45.

145

See id.

146

Justice Peckham referred obliquely to labor law as being an impermissible purpose of state law

makers. See id. at 64.
147
O.W. Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457-62 (1897).
148

See 198 U.S. 45, at 74.

149

See generally Lou FULLER, THE LAW INQUEST OF ITSELF (1940); G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, LAW AND THE INNER SELF (1993) (as analytic positivist, see 92-95 and 116117; as an ii fluence on realistic positivism, see 52-53).
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community, not for an interest group such as organized labor or an association of
merchants or manufacturers. 50 Thinking about the common law as a legislated
body of rules-rules of behavior, instead of rules of decision-transforms the
common law into a species of public law. The genesis of the common law is the
settlement of private law suits between relatively equal parties, mewn and tewn.
Thinking of the common law as a body of positive law works a fundamental
change in how it should be changed, altered, and extended.
Indeed, the genius of common law development was its case-by-case
declaration and refinement of rights and duties. To the positivist, rights and duties'
do not exist until the state, through its judges (or legislators) creates them. Moral
rights and duties may exist prior to the legal remedy, but, to a positivist, moral
rights and duties between private persons are not legal rights waiting to be
announced. Remember that Justice Holmes not only advocated for the distinction
between morality and law, he urged purging the law of rules based on "moral
responsibility" defining legal responsibility.15' He urged this purging for two
reasons: (1) moral thinking makes for uncertainty in the law, because moral
responsibility is dependent on free will and free will requires entry into the veiled
regions of mind, consciousness, and motivation (Holmes wanted objective rules
and standards, rules that require proof only of publicly observable facts); and (2)
public policy often trumps moral rights, because the public or collective good is
often more important than individual private rights.'5 2
Political progressives liked this positivist way of looking at the common
law because it reversed the privileging of the common law over legislation.
Although officially acts of legislative bodies had always trumped the common law,
legal culture (the body of those learned in the law) treated legislation-especially in
the Age of Faith/Formalism-as officious intermeddling into the judicial process of
discovering and declaring the "true" rules. Legislation got a cold reception in
common law litigation. Enacted rules were either subjected to the old saw about
legislation in derogation of the common law being narrowly construed, or more
53
likely, after Lochner v. New York (actually before Lochner in many states),1
legislation in derogation of common law rights of property or contract was
unconstitutional and void. Even choice of law doctrine did service to avoid
legislated changes in the common law. 154 If the common law is really judicial
legislation, then such legislation has less democratic pedigree than the legislation of
those elected specifically to make law for the public good.
i5o

See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 51 (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961). This is what James
Madison would call a "faction." See Id.
Holmes, The Path'of the Law, note 147 supra, especially his famous "bad men" theory at 167.
151
FULLER, supra note 156, critiques the bad man paradigm at 95-96.
Holmes, supra note 148. "Behind the Logical form [of a judicial opinion] lies ajudgement as to
152
the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds."
See, e.g., Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856); In re Application of Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98
(1885); Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354 (1886).
See, e.g., Alabama Great S. R.ILR. v. Carroll, I I So. 803 (Ala. 1893).
154
153
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Progressives also like the distancing of law from morality-since the
morality of the Age of Faith had become very conservative.,15 Substituting a new
public morality in the name of "public policy" allowed a new morality to trump
legal culture's old morality of meum and teum corrective justice-where everyone,
no matter how economically powerful or weak, was equal before the law.
The positivist vision of the common law is inspired by skepticism about
there being a true morality, especially a "true morality" of individual rights and
duties. 56 The positivists tended to be moral consequentialists, such as Jeremy
Bentham and John Austin, two utilitarians, both of whom were early advocates of
positivism. 5 7 Indeed, Thomas Hobbes, grandfather of positivism, was skeptical of
a true or singular natural law.'58 But analytical positivists were not language
skeptics. Linguistic texts could yield "objective" meaning. Therefore, they believed
rules could give positive and definitive direction to judicial decision-making and to
human behavior. Another group of early positivists were not so certain-the
American Legal Realists. 59
The American Legal Realists began the movement that I call realistic
positivism. It is positivist because they believe that judges do make the law in
common law cases, but it is realistic because they do not believe that judges'
decisions are really determined by prior rules laid down, nor that they should be.
The realist's skepticism is based in part on language skepticism-linguistic
meaning is always (or mostly) the function of the interpreter's sense of any textthe interpreter's own subjective "take" of the marks on paper. 160 In the crudest
vernacular: people read things to mean whatever they want them to mean-that's
just the way the world really is. But "rule skepticism" is also skepticism about the
utility of rules to capture the nuanced variety and complexity of private or quasipublic dispute resolution. There are more concerns that inform one's "situation

155

See MORTON J. HORWiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, THE CRISIS OF

LEGAL ORTHODOXY 4-7 (Oxford University Press 1992) and passim.
156

See DWORKIN, supranote 97.

157

See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832).

See also PHILIP

SHUCHMAN, COHEN AND COHEN'S READING IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 8 (2d ed. 1979).

The author's say: "John Austin's Province of Jurisprudenceset a pattern in Anglo-American jurisprudence
which has been closely followed, ever since, by most Anglo-American teachers and treatises in this field.
Gray and Holmes in the United States, and Holland, Pollack, and Salmond in the United Kingdom were
faithful followers of Austin's analytical approach. For Austin (1790-1859), as for his teacher, Jeremy
Bentham, clear objective analysis of the law was not an end in itself but a necessary prelude to intelligent
ethical criticism of actual rules." Id. at 8.
158
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) wrote his most famous work on politics, THE LEVIATHON in 1651.

It is excerpted in many anthologies. See, e.g., SHUCHMAN, supra note 150 at 1-5; LLOYD WEINREB,
NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 68-76 (1987).
See HORwiTz, supranote 29. The most famous single writing on legal realism is JEROME FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) The article Horwitz most recommends is Singer, Legal Realism Now,
76 CALIF. L. REV.465 (1988).
159

160

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PLAIN MEANING FALLACY, IN THE PROBLEMS OF

JURISPRUDENCE, 262-69 (1990).
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sense"' 1 than can ever be captured by a rule. Rules only capture the salient features
of a situation and not its gestalt. Rules only make for crude justice and crude
judging.'62
Moreover, while realists see law as a compound of the sense of the "justice
and sound public policy-like the rule-making analytical
situation"
of a
positivists-they see public policy choices as more nuanced and complex than do
the positivists. They would like to use the social sciences (then new) to inform their
judgments as to policy. Indeed, the realists sometimes felt that the proper policy
was too complex for judicial generalists to adumbrate in crude rules or standards. 63
To the realist, the development of rights ought to be left to legislative development,
with a structure of administrative experts to invoke and apply the rules. The
paradigm case is International News Serv. v. AssociatedPress. 164 The opinion of
Justice Mahlon Pitney epitomizes classical legal thought, while Justice Holmes's
concurrence epitomizes analytical positivism.' 65 The dissent, by Louis D. Brandeis,
represents realistic positivism at its outspoken best."
Realists were truly anti-formalists.' 67 To realists, the common law was a
process, not a body of rules. This harkens back to Llewellyn's Age of the Grand
Style and the pre-Civil War era.16 Thus, when Llewellyn talks about the Grand
Style returning after WWI, he is talking about legal realism.' 69 The formalism that
Llewellyn and his contemporaries fought against was embodied in the philosophy
of both analytical positivism and Langdel's naturalistic formalism that preceded
positivism. To the positivists, the rules were the product of the political will of
judges; to the naturalist, they were the product of the apolitical reason of judges.
Believing that the law is simply a body of rules breeds formalism. If the analytic
positivist believes that the common law is a body ofjudicially legislated law, then a
dilemma arises about change within the body of rules so legislated. If, on the one
hand, the common law is a body of "enacted" law, then the time-honored tradition
of judges is that they must obey it. Judges may interpret law as if it is vague or
ambiguous, but they must follow its plain meaning unless "plain meaning" leads to
absurdity or unconstitutionality. Thus, the present judges may not change the law
"enacted" by the past judges. On the other hand, since the common law was
"enacted" by prior judges of the same status as the present judges, then the present
161

LLEWELLYN, supra note 28, at 268-285 andpassim.

162

See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).

163

See HoRwITz, supra note 29, at 204 (quoting Justice Brandeis).

164

248 U.S. 215 (1918); See also HoRwrrz, supra note 29, at 203-05.

165

Id.

166

Id

167

General standards, not rules, were grist for the realist decisional mill. See Foreword: Kathleen M.

Sullivan, The Justiceof Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 24 (1992).
168

See LLEWELLYN, supranote 28.

169

See TWINING, supra note 121.
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judges ought to be able to legislate with the same authority as their predecessors.
"Legislating" always includes repealing old legislation and legislating anew.
Therefore, if the common law is legislated by past judges, then present judges can
simply change it to suit their present notions of justice and sound policy.
Thus, the dilemma for strict-rules positivism is that either the rules cannot
be changed (or extended) at all, or they can be changed at will. Those who are
immersed in Anglo-American legal culture know that both horns of the dilemma
violate the deep tradition of the common law in all ages. The difference between
the Grand Style judges of before 1870 and the post-1870 Langdelian Formalists
was not that one believed one could change or extend the common law at will, and
the other believed it could not be changed or extended at all. Rather, the difference
was a matter of degree involving a more or less strict adherence to precedent. To
think of the common law as a process makes a person more open to change than
thinking of the common law as a body of rules inferred from precedent. If a person
thinks that a body of rules is based on right reason and deep custom, then even a
formalist will occasionally reexamine existing social customs to determine whether
the rule is wrong and therefore a fit subject for change.170 But (and here is how the
positivists' dilemma really functions), if one believes the common law is a body of
rules laid down by judges, then, as a Gertrude Stein might have said, the common
law rules' 'just-there-ness" is salient. A rule, is a rule, is a rule. Or, with an apology
to Lord Tennyson, "Theirs not to make reply,/Theirs not to reason why/Theirs but
to find the rule,/Into the valley of Law/Rode the five judges." Thus, analytical
positivism could make "the common law" even less flexible than the classical legal
thought of the Age of Formalism. Something of this sort happened in West
Virginia, as we shall see in the next section.
To give analytical positivism its due, most positivists advocated a much
more flexible way of reading the rules of the common law than did the classicists.
So, to a positivist, the common law's body of rules had more "wiggleroom" than
the classicist's body of rules. Rules should be read with the policy of the rule in
mind. 71 The rules should be extended if the extension will further that policy.
Rules of the common law should be read so as to further the public purpose for
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 23 (1921). "The process has

170

been admirably stated by Munroe Smith:
In their effort to give to the social sense of justice articulate expression in rules and in
principles, the method of the lawfinding experts has always been experimental. The
rules and principles of case law have never been treated as final truths, but as working
hypotheses, continually retested in those great laboratories of the law, the courts of

justice. Every new case is an experiment; and if the accepted rule which seems
applicable yields a result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is reconsidered. It may not
be modified at once, for an attempt to do absolute justice in every single case would

make the development and maintenance of general rules impossible; but if a rule

171

continues to work injustice, it will eventually be reformulated.
The principles
themselves are continually retested; for if the rules derived from principle do not work
well, the principle itself must ultimately be re-examined. (Footnote omitted)"
Id. at 73 (quoting Dean Roscoe Pound: "The emphasis has changed from the content of the

precept... to the effect of the precept in action and the ... efficiency of the remedy to attain the ends for which
the precept was devised."). See also Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 603

(1908).
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which they were designed. This "functional" approach to reading rules should be
contrasted with the "conceptualistic" approach of classicists. Moreover, the analytic
positivists recognized a substantial indeterminateness in language and accordingly,
in rules. But rules were not nearly as indeterminate to analytic positivists as they
were to realists. H.L.A. Hart wrote of the "core" and "penumbra" of the rules laid
down. 172 If a case is a core example (a paradigm) of the rule-follow it. If it is in
the penumbra of the rule, go where the rule's function leads. Nonetheless, actually
over-ruling rules instead of gradually narrowing their "core" has always been a
distinct problem for analytic positivism.
In sum, the trajectory of common law thinking in 400 years of American
history has been from thinking the common law as a more-or-less fixed body of
rules (colonial period); to thinking the common law was discovered by judicial
reason, utilizing a process of precedent and fresh discovery (pre-Civil War era); to
thinking of the common law as a body of rules laid down by the apolitical reason of
judges (pre-WWI era); to thinking of it as a body of rules laid down by the political
(but virtuous) will of the judges (post-WWI positivists); to thinking of the common
law as a process of deciding cases where there is no body of rules to give positive
direction, but a body of rulings that give important and often crucial guidance to the
will of the present decision-maker (post-WWI realists). In short, the idea of the
common law went from formal naturalism, to functional naturalism, to
conceptual/formal naturalism, to conceptual positivism, to functional realism.
Somewhere in the "Age of Anxiety,"1' 73 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia got slightly derailed from Judge Berkshire's useful Grand Style
thinking.1 74 Is it any wonder?
III. USING HISTORY AND LEGAL THEORY TO EXPLAIN
WEST VIRGINIA'S UNNOTICED ABSURDITY.

One can conclude from the cases reviewed in Section I that the Supreme
Court of West Virginia did not articulate either a strong or weak version of the
absurdity of being bound by old cases from other jurisdictions, but not being bound
by newer cases from its own jurisdiction, until relatively recently. In any event, the
Court never actually followed an old common law doctrine that it really did not
like, but felt constitutionally bound to follow. Nonetheless, two highly respected
West Virginia jurists, Fred Caplan and Charles Haden, did articulate the absurdity
while finessing its consequences. Why did these judges not notice the absurdity? I
have already suggested some reasons, above. But I now need to explain what I
believe to be the overarching reason the excellent courts of the 1960s and 1970s
missed the absurdity of the doctrine to which they paid lip service.
The idea of the common law had metamorphosed, as discussed above,
172

See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-32 (1961).

173

See GILMORE, supra note 109 at 68-98.

174

See supranotes 21-27 and accompanying text.
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from an unwritten body of principles and rules discovered by the reason and
experience of common law judges (nineteenth century), into a body of written rules
created by judges to best serve the community (twentieth century). As noted above,
the change in the idea of the common law is much more complex than this
simplification, but this simple version of the change makes salient the features that
cause confusion. One cannot incorporate by reference unwritten rules. Therefore
the original use (i.e. the nineteenth-century use) of the phrase "common law shall
continue" was not a reference to a "body of rules," 175
but to a time-honored process
for discovering the unwritten law of the community.
Until the early part of the twentieth century, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals paid little heed to the common-law-shall-continue clause. Then,
the idea that the "common law" was actually a body of identifiable principles and
rules crept in from classical legal thought and then from Holmesian positivism.
Classical legal thought viewed "the common law" as originally unwritten but now
mostly "written down" in cases and learned treatises, such that the unwritten law
was now written, but its spirit was still unwritten universal law and unwritten
community morality and custom. Holmesian positivism said the common law is
that body of "written down" rules, rules announced in cases. The rules come not
from unwritten community (or universal) morality and custom, but from the
assessment of judges settling disputes as to what would be best for the community
they help govern. The judges made this body of common law rules like a legislator
making law for the good of the community. This metamorphosis of the common
law as merely a process to the common law as a knowable body of written rules,
and then from a "knowable body of written rules" from morality to a "knowable
body of written rules" from judicial legislation, made it easy to perceive that the
1863 constitutional fathers intended to incorporate by reference this body of written
rules as "the common law., 17' Remember, in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,'" the United
States Supreme Court, through the highly respected Louis Brandeis, said that
Justice Story was wrong from the beginning and that the common law had always
been "the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign.' 178
In Morningstar v. Black and Decker, 253 S.E.2d 666, 675 (W. Va. 1979), Justice Miller
concluded: "the term the 'common law' encompasses two components: first a body.... of case precedents
175

extending from the present time back into the ancient courts of England;... and.., a system of reasoning from
case to case... that permits the common law to grow... and adapt." He then quotes from Dean Pound's THE
SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921).
176

See supra note 4.

177

304 U.S. 64 (1938).There, Justice Brandeis declared for a 6-2 majority (Cardozo did not

participate): "And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest
court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern." Id. at 78. Later, "the voice adopted by the State as its
own [whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court] should utter the last word." Id. at 79. (Brackets

in the original)
178

See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 207, 222 (1917). But in Erie Justice Brandeis did

refer to the "common law" as "the unwritten law of the State as declared by its highest court..." & "would
apply as their rules of decision the law of the State, unwritten as well as written." Erie, 304 U.S. at 71,73

But this reference back to a bygone era's notion of the common law runs counter to Brandeis's reliance on
Holmes:
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Even though West Virginia never made strong use of either the strongest
or weakest formulation of the absurdity, the Court did make weak use of the
weaker formulation: We (the Court) must follow old cases from some sort of
American (or general) common law, but we need not always follow our own newer
case precedent. In all the cases that cite the weaker formulation as the law of West
Virginia, the weak formulation never really dictated the result reached in the cases.
The Court simply avoided the cognitive dissonance of acting on an absurd principle
by saying that (1) it is not a "bad rule," it is a "good rule," or (2) the "bad rule"
does not apply to this case situation, or (3) the "bad rule" is part of our "case law"
and therefore is no longer a relevant part of the common law that cannot be
overruled.
The first two are rather standard cases involving judicial avoidance of bad
results. The first is that it is not absurd because the court is "forced" to follow a
good rule to a good result. The second avoidance technique (distinguishing the bad
case) does not force the court to reach the undesired result. But the third avoidance
method, contrasting "case law" with "common law," is itself absurd. In our legal
culture, it has always been understood that there are three kinds of law:
constitutional, statutory, and common law. "Case law" is but a gloss on one of
those three kinds of law. There is not a fourth kind of law called "case law."179
Why was the West Virginia Court able to avoid an absurdity with an
absurdity? My best guess is that it is because the Court thought the "common law"
was a "body of written rules." A body of written rules has a specific knowable
identity. It is located (and limited) in time and space. However, the West Virginia
Court also believed in the 1960s and '70s that the "common law" was a "process
for deciding cases based on precedent"--precedent that must persuade the Court in
each new case that justice and public policy allowed the rule implicit in the case to
be followed. But in the context of the constitutional common-law-shall-continue
The fallacy underlying the rule declared in Swift v. Tyson is made clear by Mr. Justice
Holmes. The doctrine rests upon the assumption that there is 'a transcendental body of
law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by
statute,' that federal courts have the power to use their judgment as to what the rules of
common law are; and that in the federal courts 'the parties are entitled to an independent
judgment on matters of general law': 'but law in the sense in which courts speak of it
today does not exist without some definite authority behind it. The common law so far
as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or not, is not the common law
generally but the law of that State existing by the authority of that State without regard
to what it may have been in England or anywhere else... 'the authority and only
authority is the State, and if that be so the voice adopted by the State as its own
[whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court] should utter the last word. Id.
at 79 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted.) (Brackets in original) Brandeis's nod to the
genesis of "the common law" from unwritten morality is a mere genuflection to the
"myths of antiquity". The common law "in the sense in which courts speak of it today"
is the uttered [promulgated] "last word" of the legislature or the supreme court" - i.e. it
is written law.
179
One ought not to need an authoritative citation for this, but if you have any doubt remember that
when the federal courts have to act without the positive guidance of a statute or constitution, the courts call it
"federal common law.' See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie and the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383 (1964). Erie led to the "emergence of a federal decisional law in areas of national
concern that is truly uniform because under the supremacy clause, it is binding in every forum" and the
clarion, yet careful, pronouncement ofErie that there is no "federal general common law." See id. at 178.
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clause, the Court picked one version for the clause (the body of written rules; the
common law as a "plain fact"'' 8 version), and another version for how the Court
actually decided cases without the positive guidance of enacted law. Judge Caplan
called this second version "case law" (what had traditionally been called "common
law"), apparently to avoid the dissonance of contradictory definitions for the same
thing.
But why did the Court not say what it eventually said in Morningstar v.
Black & Decker,'8' and earlier said in Judge Berkshire's 1871 opinion, that the
"common law" is "a process based on precedent" not "a body of rules"? The
answer must be that there was significant West Virginia case precedent implying
that the common law is a body of written rules. As noted above, these cases were
all the weak use of the weaker absurdity ("common law" antedating 1863 as
opposed to "common law precedent from England" antedating 1863). Yet, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated in unmistakable language that the Court
cannot overrule old common law rules. Those cases which make such a
pronouncement date from a time when the American legal culture was moving
away from notions of the common law being rules discovered and announced by
judges, and moving toward the idea that the common law was a body of rules made
and enacted by judges. Under Brannon and Dent's influence, until at least 1916,
"the common law" was still a body of precedent that must continue to persuade.
Without Brannon and Dent, the influence of Langdell and Holmes seeped in
together (i.e. the Court fused the naturalist's and positivist's formalisms into the
confused idea that the common law is a body of "true rules made by judges").
"True ruleness" implies fixed and certain rules. However, if the true rule is
discovered by judges (as Story had declared in Swift v. Tyson), then present judges
can rediscover (by more careful reasoning) that the "true rule" is not true anymore.
But if the "true and certain rule" is made by a judge, then it is "willed" into being
just like legislatively enacted rules. To Holmes, judges made law but not "true
law." Holmes had a formalist side (especially with enacted law),1 82 but he also had
a pragmatic side ("all life is an experiment"). 18 3 To Holmes, all law was
experimental but judge-made law was especially experimental. A rule was a
hypothesis as to what is best for the community, subject always to be tested in the
experience of the next judge in the next case.
By conflating "true rules" and "made by judges," both the Story/Langdell
theory of change and the Holmes theory of change are eliminated. "The common
law" becomes a fixed and settled body of enacted law-a body fit to be
incorporated by reference. 1' At first, the use was weak because it merely supported
180

DWORKIN, supra note 97 (Dworkin notes that most layman and many lawyer's believe law to be a

"plain fact").
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253 S.E.2d 666 (W.Va. 1979); see supranote 5.
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See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911).
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See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
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Of course, I am only speculating as to what went on in the minds of the judges in the litany of
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a result the Court thought just and proper anyway. But numerous weak uses made
the glibly-announced doctrine seem to be part of the "law of West Virginia."
Hence, when the use threatened to be strong (i.e. the actual reason for a result that
was otherwise thought not proper), the Court managed to either distinguish the old
case so that the constitutional doctrine did not apply, or declare the older case not
to be "common law" but "case law." Not until 1979 was the Court squarely faced
with the strong use of the doctrine.1 s5 The Court quickly wiped it out.
-IV. A CONCLUDING LESSON: SYLLABUS POINTS AND THE

COMMON LAW TRADITION
Some lessons may be learned from our excursion into legal history and
jurisprudence. Perhaps, common law courts (state courts) ought to be wary of
formulating precise rules of decision as the basis for decisions they reach in
common law cases. This practice may prove hazardous to healthy decision making
if the precisely-worded rule is reduced to official syllabus points. They seem like
legislation.
In his 1960 book, The Common Law Tradition, Llewellyn observed that
official syllabus points might be an unhealthy decisional practice. It is worth
quoting four paragraphs from Llewellyn's book, not only because the quotation is
instructive, but also because it is illustrative of Llewellyn's unique scholarly
methodology and writing style."c
Ohio deserves a special word because at the 1940 University of
Cincinnati Conference on Precedent I heard Chief Justice
Weygandt announce with conviction that the Ohio lawyer knew
that the syllabus stated the law-certainly when screened through
the facts--so that though nonsyllabus men might smile, Ohio
lawyers had much less trouble than others on the matter of
precedent. 18 * This did not fit either with general theory or with
what I had been finding in the Ohio cases, so I have been on the
lookout since.
cases cited above. But since the judges only made weak use of the doctrine they announced, the
announcement was glib, offhand, and not the product ofcareful study.
185
See Morningstar,253 S.E.2d at 666.
186

LLEWELLYN, supra note 28, at 97-99.

Here is Llewellyn's footnote: Report of the Cincinnati Conference on the Status of the Rule of
Stare Decisis, 14 U. CIN. L. REv. 203, 218, 284-285(1940). I made a short sampling of then current Ohio
material, and reported thereon in Impressions of the Conference, ibid. 343, 348 F., that the Ohio court
seemed to be doing much what nonsyllabus courts did, with their prior opinions. This in turn led to picking
Ohio for one of the 300-page samplings, where the picture was the same. Years later, in preparing to deliver
Marx lectures at the University of Cincinnati in the late spring of 1953, I used the successive Ohio Supreme
Court full opinions found in the advance sheets of January 14 through April 22 ofthat year (109-111 N.E.2d).
Among the 19 treated in this study (cf. Pp. 148 if.) there were 3 or more opinions from 3 ofthe judges, 2 each
from Weygandt, Hart, and Middleton, and one from Zimmerman, plus 7 per Curiams.
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The general theory of the Ohio syllabus system is that the court
prepared syllabus states the law of the State. I do not know
whether the Chief meant, also, that the court's opinion does not
state the law of the State. But if the "system" were what it
officially purports to be, it would be substituting carefully
considered digest-paragraphs for the more loosely written opiniontext as the precedent-material for use, and would therefore, if the
theory were lived by, greatly cut down on growth or directionshift by way of dicta or of rule-rationale or of such announced
rules or rulings as have not seemed vital to the court which
decided the prior case. One might of course fear that the opinion
would become surplusage, and would not be felt as available to
confine and distinguish a syllabus, or, on the other hand, to
underpin a syllabus by showing that some current contention had
been carefully taken into account before the syllabus rule was
formulated - - much less, to build a rule of law not mentioned in

the syllabus.
Neither the 1939 study, however, nor a subsequent one in 1953
uncovered any effects of this character. Detail to illustrate this is
reported chiefly from the latter....

I have only checked Ohio, but the nature of the case is clear: not
even a "syllabus system" can escape from the flat fact: Divergent,
mutually inconsistent precedent techniques are at work in the daily
mine-run of appellate cases. The little case, the ordinarycase, is a
constant occasion and vehicle for creative choice and creative
activity,for the shapingand on-going reshapingof our case law.
That is our system of precedent. [emphasis in original]
West Virginia too is a "syllabus state." A constitutional provision states:
When a judgment or order of another court is reversed, modified,
or affirmed by the court . . . the reasons therefore shall be

concisely stated in writing.., and it shall be the duty of the court
to prepare a syllabus of the points adjudicated in each case ...
which shall be prefixed to the published report of the case."a
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W. VA. CONST. art. VIII,

§ 4. See also W. VA. CODE § 58-5-21
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In Bank v. Burdette, 89 Judge Brannon off-handedly remarked that "our constitution
requires the court to make the syllabus, and it is that which is the real decision over
the opinion."'" Yet in an earlier opinion concurred in by Brannon, the Court held
that "[t]his court only makes the more important points of law a part of the syllabus
for the general information of the legal profession and public."' 91
Further, in syllabus point 5 of a 1953 case, the Court stated that "[p]oint 2,
Syllabus, State v. Collins, 108 W.Va. 98 [150 S.E. 369] read in light of the opinion
and the facts therein and explained."' l"a In that case, Judge James B. Riley (with
Frank C. Haymond and Chauncey H. Browning) quoted several West Virginia
cases to the effect: "The syllabus of the case must, of course, be read in the light of
the opinion."'193 Judge Riley goes on to endorse Dean Thomas Hardman's version
of the syllabus controversy: "For an illuminating and learned discussion of the
function of the syllabus of a case decided by this court see [two articles by Dean
Hardman]."' 94 In the very brief second of these endorsed articles, Dean Hardman
stated: "In such cases (if not in all cases) the oft-asserted theory that the syllabus is
the law in West Virginia would seem to be pretty much at variance with the
realities; in such cases the syllabus is at best only a partial expression of the ratio
decidendi."'19 5
Has court-written syllabus practice in fact caused damage to common law
development in West Virginia, or has the Court merely paid lip service to the
proposition that the syllabus states the law? An actual case-by-case analysis of the
recent work product of the West Virginia Court would be necessary to answer this
question. Until someone undertakes that study, we can only guess from the abovecited West Virginia cases and articles, and from Karl Llewellyn's study in Ohio,
that syllabus practice does no great damage to the ongoing articulation of the
common law in West Virginia.
This is known with reasonable certainty: The Court is required to write
syllabus points by the constitution and a statute; the requirement is not mandatory;
nothing in the constitution or statutory text suggests that the syllabus points, rather
189

57 S.E. 53, 54 (W.Va. 1907).

190

Id.

191

Koonce v. Doolittle, 48 W.Va. 592, 594,37 S.E. 644 (1900)(quoted in Thomas P. Hardman, "The

Law" - In West Virginia, 47 W.VA. L.Q. 23 (1940)(emphasis is by Dean Hardman). Thomas P. Hardman was

the Dean of West Virginia University College ofLaw from 1931 to 1956.
192
State v. Franklin, 795 S.E.2d 692, 693 (W.Va. 1953).
193

Id at 700 (quoting Medford v. Levy, 8 S.E. 302 (W.Va. 1888)).

194

Id
Thomas P. Hardman, Note, The Syllabus is the Law, 47 W.VA. L.Q. 141, 142 (1941)( (footnote
omitted). In a 1956 student note triggered by State v. Franklin, 79 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1953), John Lewis
McClaugherty, now the managing partner of West Virginia's largest law firm, concluded: "It is further
submitted that those who believe the syllabus represents the law of an adjudicated case are forced to admit
otherwise, for here in the syllabus [of State v. Franklin],the court states that the syllabus of the Collins case
was read in light of the opinion-an interesting paradox for those who believe the syllabus is "the law" in
West Virginia."
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than the opinion, "state the law;" and ample West Virginia authority shows that the
Court, when it really counts, looks to the opinion (the facts, holding, and analysis)
for guidance, not the syllabus points.
I still have reservations about court-written syllabus point practice. I
cannot help but think that it makes some of the judges, some of the time, believe
the common law is a body of rules enacted by judges. This is apparently Justice
Maynard's assumption as noted near the beginning of this article."9 In so far as it
has that effect, it works against the great common law tradition for deciding
appeals, and thus against the time-honored and tested method for the administration
of justice in our community. Let me conclude with a brief quotation from Dean
Roscoe Pound in an address delivered to the alumni of the West Virginia College
of Law in 1940:
Thinking of law in terms of rules has led to false ideas of our
common-law technique and as to our doctrine of precedents. We
must remember the short life of rules
We must ever bear in mind that in law we have a taught tradition
of experience developed by reason and reason tested by
experience...The common law grew up as a taught tradition in the
Inns of Court on the basis of the tradition of the courts. It was a
taught tradition handed down from lawyer to apprentice from the
seventeenth century, and is now coming to be a taught tradition of
academic law schools. Both of the two great legal systems of the
modem world are taught traditions and so have been resistant to
forces that destroy political institutions. We have in our law such a
tradition molded through the technique of the lawyer to the everchanging circumstances of time and place and so one of the most
enduring of human institutions.1 97

196

Appellate judges, as explained in this article above, can have one of two mindsets about common

law change when they believe that the common law is "a body of rules enacted by judges." One makes stare
decisis a straight jacket- enacted law is absolutely binding like any legislated law (unless unconstitutional).
This is apparently Justice Maynard's position. The other is that courts can act like legislators and enact any
new law they wish. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. Neither view is within the common law
tradition. The majority in Bower v. Westinghouse, 522 S.E.2d 424 (1999), purport to follow the common law
tradition which includes a "well grounded extension of traditional common-law tort principle." Bower, 522
S.E.2d at 429. The majority believed the "new cause of action" to be such an extension. It would, however,
not be within the common law tradition to create a truly unprecedented new cause of action. It would, in
general, not be legitimate for the court to create a cause of action that upsets the public's reliance on "rights"
created by precedent cases. For example, to abrogate the "employment at will" doctrine in toto would be a
strikingly illegitimate use ofjudicial power and far outside the common law tradition.
197
Roscoe Pound, What is Law?, 47 W.VA. L.Q. 1,11-12 (1940).
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